Opinions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of South Carolina advance sheet no. 28 by South Carolina. Supreme Court
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
OPINIONS 

OF 

THE SUPREME COURT 

AND 

COURT OF APPEALS 

OF
	
SOUTH CAROLINA 

ADVANCE SHEET NO. 28 

July 13, 2016 

Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk 

Columbia, South Carolina 

www.sccourts.org 

1 

 2 
 
 CONTENTS    THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA        PUBLISHED OPINIONS AND ORDERS  27646 - David M. Pascoe v. Alan M. Wilson and David M. Pascoe v.  12               James R. Parks, Clerk of Court for the State Grand Jury     27647 - The State v. Graham F. Douglas   38  
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
 
2016-MO-024 - Edward Byrd v. Craig Nesbit   
        (Lee County, Judge George C. James, Jr.) 
 
PETITIONS - UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT  27601 - Richard Stogsdill v. SCDHHS    Pending   EXTENSION TO FILE PETITION - UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT  26770 - The State v. Charles Christopher Williams  Granted until 9/9/2016  
 
PETITIONS FOR REHEARING  27625 - In the Matter of Robert Ryan Breckenridge Pending  
27627 - CareAlliance Health Services v. SCDOR Pending  27633 - The State v. Melvin P. Stukes  Pending  27639 - Linda Johnson v. Heritage Healthcare Pending  27640 - Francis P. Maybank v. BB&T  Denied 7/13/2016  
  
   
The South Carolina Court of Appeals 
 
 
PUBLISHED OPINIONS 
 
5424-Janette Buchanan v. South Carolina Property and Casualty Ins.  40 
        Guar. Ass'n 
 
5425-Carolyn Taylor-Cracraft v. Gerald Cracraft 47 
 
5426-Tina G. McMillan v. Jimmy D. McMillan     57   
 
5427-Spartanburg Buddhist Center v. Ron Ork and Luke Dong        71 
 
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
 
2016-UP-358-State v. Maurice Alphonso Roberts, Jr. 
 
PETITIONS FOR REHEARING 
 
5391-Peggy D. Conits v. Spiro E. Conits Pending 
 
5393-S.C. Ins. Reserve Fund v. East Richland Public Service Dist. Pending 
 
5398-Claude W. Graham v. Town of Latta Pending 
 
5403-Virginia Marshall v. Kenneth Dodds Pending 
 
5406-Charles Gary v. Hattie Askew Pending 
 
5407-One Belle Hall v. Trammell Crow (TAMKO) Pending 
 
5408-Martina R. Putnam v. State Pending 
 
5410-Protection and Advocacy v. Beverly Buscemi Pending 
 
5411-John Doe v. City of Duncan Pending 
 
5415-Timothy McMahan v. S.C. Department of Education Pending 
 
5416-Allen Patterson v. Herb Witter Pending 
 
3 

  
5417-Meredith Huffman v. Sunshine Recycling Pending 
 
5421-Coastal Federal Credit v. Angel Latoria Brown Pending 
 
2016-UP-028-Arthur Washington v. Resort Services Pending 
 
2016-UP-084-Esvin Perez v. Gino's The King of Pizza Pending 
 
2016-UP-099-Carrie Steele v. William Steele Pending 
 
2016-UP-139-Hector Fragosa v. Kade Construction Pending 
 
2016-UP-158-Raymond Carter v. Donnie Myers Pending 
 
2016-UP-163-James Tinsley v. SCDPPPS Pending 
 
2016-UP-182-State v. James Simmons, Jr. Pending 
 
2016-UP-184-D&C Builders v. Richard Buckley Pending 
 
2016-UP-199-Ryan Powell v. Amy Bohler Pending 
 
2016-UP-204-Thomas Lowery v. SCDPPPS Pending 
 
2016-UP-206-State v. Devatee Tymar Clinton Pending 
 
2016-UP-210-Bernard Bagley v. SCDPPPS Pending 
 
2016-UP-220-SCDSS v. Allyssa Boulware Pending 
 
2016-UP-239-State v. Kurtino Weathersbee Pending 
 
2016-UP-245-State v. Rodney Lee Rogers, Sr. Pending 
 
2016-UP-247-Pankaj Patel v. Krish Patel Pending 
 
2016-UP-248-Bruce R. Hoffman v. Seneca Specialty Pending 
 
2016-UP-253-Melissa Lackey v. 4 K&D Corporation Pending 
 
2016-UP-257-State v. James S. Cross Pending 
 
2016-UP-261-Samuel T. Brick v. Richland County Pending 
4 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
     
 
     
 
      
 
2016-UP-263-Wells Fargo Bank v. Ronald Pappas Pending 
2016-UP-264-Deutsche Bank v.  Dora S. Morrow Pending 
2016-UP-266-Townes at Pelham v. Donna Boyd Pending 
2016-UP-268-SCDSS v. David and Kimberly Wicker Pending 
2016-UP-271-Lori Partin v. Jason Harbin Pending 
2016-UP-274-Bayview Loan Servicing v. Scott Schledwitz Pending 
2016-UP-275-City of North Charleston v. John Barra Pending 
2016-UP-276-Hubert Bethune v. Waffle House Pending 
2016-UP-280-Juan Ramirez v. Progressive Northern Pending 
2016-UP-281-James A. Sellers v. SCDC Pending 
2016-UP-299-State v. Donna Boyd Pending 
2016-UP-303-Lydia Miller v. Willie Fields Pending 
2016-UP-305-Phil Vasey v. Colton Builders Pending 
2016-UP-316-Helen Marie Douglas v. State Pending 
2016-UP-318-SunTrust Mortgage v. Mark Ostendorff Pending 
2016-UP-325-NBSC v. Thaddeus F. Segars Pending 
PETITIONS-SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT 
5253-Sierra  Club  v.  Chem-Nuclear     Pending  
5254-State  v.  Leslie  Parvin       Pending  
5295-Edward  Freiburger  v.  State      Pending  
5301-State  v.  Andrew  T.  Looper      Pending  
5 

 5322-State   v.   Daniel   D.   Griffin      Pending   
 
5326-Denise   Wright   v.   PRG      Pending   
 
5328-Matthew McAlhaney v. Richard McElveen   Pending 
 
5329-State   v.   Stephen   Douglas   Berry     Pending   
 
5333-Yancey   Roof   v.   Kenneth   A.   Steele     Pending   
 
5336-Phillip Flexon v. PHC-Jasper, Inc.     Pending   
 
5338-Bobby   Lee   Tucker   v.   John   Doe     Pending   
 
5342-John   Goodwin   v.   Landquest      Pending   
 
5344-Stoneledge v. IMK Development (Southern Concrete)  Pending 
 
5345-Jacklyn Donevant v. Town of Surfside Beach   Pending 
 
5346-State   v.   Lamont   A.   Samuel      Pending   
 
5348-Gretchen   A.   Rogers   v.   Kenneth   E.   Lee    Pending   
 
5355-State   v.   Lamar   Sequan   Brown     Pending   
 
5359-Bobby   Joe   Reeves   v.   State      Pending   
 
5360-Claude   McAlhany   v.   Kenneth   A.   Carter    Pending   
 
5365-Thomas Lyons v. Fidelity National     Pending   
 
5366-David   Gooldy   v.   The   Storage   Center    Pending   
 
5368-SCDOT   v.   David   Powell      Pending   
 
5369-Boisha   Wofford   v.   City   of   Spartanburg    Pending   
 
5370-Ricky Rhame v. Charleston County School   Dismissed  07/05/16 
 
5371-Betty   Fisher   v.   Bessie   Huckabee     Pending   
 
 
6 

  
5373-Robert S. Jones v. Builders Investment Group   Pending 
 
5374-David M. Repko v. County of Georgetown   Pending 
 
5375-Mark   Kelley   v.   David   Wren      Pending   
 
5378-Stephen   Smalls   v.   State      Pending   
 
5382-State   v.   Marc   A.   Palmer      Pending   
 
5384-Mae Ruth Thompson v. Pruitt Corporation   Pending 
 
5389-Fred   Gatewood   v.   SCDC   (2)     Pending   
 
5390-State   v.   Tyrone   King      Pending   
 
5392-State   v.   Johnie   Allen  Devore,   Jr.    Pending   
 
5395-State   v.   Gerald   Barrett,   Jr.      Pending   
 
5399-State   v.   Anthony   Bailey      Pending   
                                                                                          
2015-UP-010-Latonya Footman v. Johnson Food Services  Pending 
 
2015-UP-091-U.S.   Bank   v.   Kelley   Burr     Pending   
 
2015-UP-215-Ex Parte Tara Dawn Shurling (In re: State v. Harley) Pending 
 
2015-UP-248-South Carolina Electric & Gas v. Anson   Pending 
 
2015-UP-262-State   v.   Erick   Arroyo     Pending   
 
2015-UP-266-State   v.   Gary   Eugene   Lott     Pending   
 
2015-UP-300-Peter T. Phillips v. Omega Flex, Inc.   Pending 
 
2015-UP-303-Charleston County Assessor v. LMP Properties  Pending 
 
2015-UP-304-Robert K. Marshall, Jr. v. City of Rock Hill  Pending 
 
2015-UP-311-State   v.   Marty   Baggett     Pending   
 
7 

  
2015-UP-330-Bigford Enterprises v. D. C. Development  Pending 
 
2015-UP-333-Jennifer Bowzard v. Sheriff Wayne Dewitt  Pending 
 
2015-UP-339-LeAndra Lewis v. L. B. Dynasty, Inc.   Pending 
 
2015-UP-350-Ebony   Bethea   v.   Derrick   Jones    Pending   
 
2015-UP-353-Wilmington Savings Fund v. Furmanchik  Pending 
 
2015-UP-357-Linda   Rodarte   v.   USC     Pending   
 
2015-UP-361-JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Leah Sample   Pending 
 
2015-UP-362-State   v.   Martin   D.   Floyd     Pending   
 
2015-UP-364-Andrew   Ballard   v.   Tim   Roberson    Pending   
 
2015-UP-365-State   v.   Ahmad   Jamal  Wilkins    Pending   
 
2015-UP-367-Angela Patton v. Dr. Gregory A. Miller   Pending 
 
2015-UP-376-Ron Orlosky v. Law Office of Jay Mullinax  Pending 
 
2015-UP-377-Long Grove at Seaside v. Long Grove Property  Pending 
Owners ( James, Harwick & Partners) 
 
2015-UP-378-State   v.   James   Allen  Johnson    Pending   
 
2015-UP-381-State   v.   Stepheno   J.   Alston    Pending   
 
2015-UP-382-State   v.   Nathaniel   B.   Beeks    Pending   
 
2015-UP-388-Joann Wright v. William Enos    Pending   
 
2015-UP-391-Cambridge Lakes v. Johnson Koola   Pending 
 
2015-UP-395-Brandon Hodge v. Sumter County   Pending 
 
2015-UP-402-Fritz Timmons v. Browns AS RV and Campers  Pending 
 
2015-UP-403-Angela   Parsons   v.   Jane   Smith    Pending   
8 

  
 
2015-UP-414-Christopher A. Wellborn v. City of Rock Hill  Pending 
 
2015-UP-423-North Pleasant, LLC v. SC Coastal Conservation Pending 
 
2015-UP-432-Barbara Gaines v. Joyce Ann Campbell   Pending 
 
2015-UP-446-State   v.   Tiphani   Marie   Parkhurst    Pending   
 
2015-UP-455-State   v.   Michael   L.   Cardwell    Pending   
 
2015-UP-466-State v. Harold Cartwright, III    Pending   
 
2015-UP-477-State v. William D. Bolt     Pending   
 
2015-UP-478-State   v.   Michael   Camp     Pending   
 
2015-UP-485-State   v.   Alfonzo   Alexander    Pending   
 
2015-UP-491-Jacquelin S. Bennett v. T. Heyward Carter, Jr.  Pending 
 
2015-UP-501-State   v.   Don-Survi   Chisolm    Pending   
 
2015-UP-505-Charles Carter v. S.C. Dep't of Corr. (3)   Pending 
 
2015-UP-513-State   v.   Wayne   A.   Scott,  Jr.    Pending   
 
2015-UP-524-State   v.   Gary   R.   Thompson    Pending   
 
2015-UP-540-State   v.   Michael   McCraw     Pending   
 
2015-UP-547-Evalena Catoe v. The City of Columbia   Pending 
 
2015-UP-556-State   v.   Nathaniel   Witherspoon    Pending   
 
2015-UP-557-State   v.   Andrew   A.   Clemmons    Pending   
 
2015-UP-564-State   v.   Tonya   Mcalhaney     Pending   
 
2015-UP-568-State   v.   Damian   D.   Anderson    Pending   
 
2015-UP-574-State   v.   Brett   D.   Parker     Pending   
9 

  
 
2016-UP-010-State   v.   James   Clyde   Dill,   Jr.    Pending   
 
2016-UP-012-Whelthy   McKune   v.   State     Pending   
 
2016-UP-013-Ex parte State of South Carolina   In re: Cathy  Pending 
         J. Swicegood v. Polly A. Thompson 
 
2016-UP-021-State v. Darius Ranson-Williams    Pending   
 
2016-UP-023-Frankie Lee Bryant, III, v. State    Pending   
 
2016-UP-039-State   v.   Fritz   Allen  Timmons    Pending   
 
2016-UP-040-State v. Jonathan Xavier Miller    Pending   
 
2016-UP-052-Randall   Green   v.   Wayne   Bauerle    Pending   
 
2016-UP-054-Ex Parte: S.C. Coastal Conservation League   Pending 
v. Duke Energy 
 
2016-UP-055-State   v.   Ryan   P.   Deleston     Pending   
 
2016-UP-056-Gwendolyn Sellers v. Cleveland Sellers, Jr.  Pending 
 
2016-UP-061-Charleston   Harbor   v.   Paul   Davis    Pending   
 
2016-UP-067-National Security Fire v. Rosemary Jenrette  Pending 
 
2016-UP-068-State   v.   Marcus   Bailey     Pending   
 
2016-UP-069-John   Frick   v.   Keith  Fulmer    Pending   
 
2016-UP-070-State v. Deangelo Mitchell (AA Ace Bail)  Pending 
 
2016-UP-073-State   v.   Mandy   L.   Smith     Pending   
 
2016-UP-074-State   v.   Sammy   Lee   Scarborough    Pending   
 
2016-UP-089-William Breland v. SCDOT    Pending   
 
2016-UP-091-Kyle Pertuis v. Front Roe Restaurants, Inc.  Pending 
10 

  
 
2016-UP-097-State   v.   Ricky   E.   Passmore    Pending   
 
2016-UP-118-State   v.   Lywone   S.   Capers     Pending   
 
2016-UP-119-State v. Bilal Sincere Haynesworth   Pending 
 
2016-UP-127-James Neff v. Lear's Welding    Pending   
 
2016-UP-134-SCDSS   v.   Stephanie   N.   Aiken    Pending   
 
2016-UP-138-McGuinn Construction v. Saul Espino   Pending 
 
2016-UP-141-Plantation Federal v. J. Charles Gray   Pending 
 
2016-UP-153-Andreas Ganotakis v. City of Columbia Board  Pending 
 
2016-UP-160-Mariam R. Noorai v. School Dist. of  Pickens Cty. Pending 
 
2016-UP-171-Nakia   Jones  v.   State     Pending   
 
2016-UP-177-Mike Russell v. Randolph Gill    Pending   
 
11 

  
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

David M. Pascoe, Solicitor of the First Judicial Circuit, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Alan M. Wilson, South Carolina Attorney General, 

Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2016-000671 

David M. Pascoe, Solicitor of the First Judicial Circuit, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
James R. Parks, Clerk of Court for the State Grand Jury, 

Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2016-000630 

IN THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 
Opinion No. 27646 

Heard June 16, 2016 – Filed July 13, 2016 

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ISSUED 
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David M. Pascoe, Jr., of Orangeburg, pro se Petitioner. 
C. Mitchell Brown, of Nelson Mullins Riley & 
Scarborough, LLP, Attorney General Alan McCrory 
Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. 
McIntosh, Solicitor General Robert D. Cook, Assistant 
Deputy Attorney General  Samuel Creighton Waters, all 
of Columbia, for Respondents. 
CHIEF JUSTICE PLEICONES: We agreed to hear these cases in the Court's 
original jurisdiction. The cases arise out of an on-going South Carolina Law 
Enforcement Division ("SLED") investigation into the past conduct of certain 
members of the General Assembly (the "redacted legislators").  Petitioner David 
Pascoe ("Pascoe") asks this Court declare "the Attorney General" recused himself 
and his Office from the redacted legislators matter, and vested Pascoe with the 
legal authority to act autonomously as the designee of the Attorney General with 
the powers of that Office. Pascoe further asks this Court command respondent 
James R. Parks ("Parks"), clerk of the state grand jury, to cooperate with Pascoe's 
initiation of the state grand jury investigation.  We grant the petition for 
declaratory relief and declare that respondent Attorney General Wilson ("Wilson") 
and the Attorney General's Office were recused from the redacted legislators 
investigation; Pascoe lawfully sought to initiate a state grand jury investigation; 
and the Attorney General's Office's purported termination of Pascoe's designation 
was not valid. Recognizing the integrity of the parties involved, we decline to 
formally issue relief in the mandamus action, confident that our resolution of the 
declaratory judgment action makes clear the responsibilities and roles of the 
parties. 
FACTS
As these cases are being heard in the Court's original jurisdiction, we sit as the 
fact-finders.1  The burden of proof as to all issues rests with Pascoe.2 
1 See S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-340 (1977) ("Whenever in the course of any action or 
proceeding in the Supreme Court arising in the exercise of the original jurisdiction 
13 

  
 
   
                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On July 24, 2014, Wilson appointed Pascoe to serve as the "designated prosecutor" 
in the investigation and prosecution of Robert Harrell ("Harrell").3  At the time of 
Pascoe's appointment, Harrell was being investigated for alleged crimes committed
in his capacity as a legislator.  A SLED report generated during the Harrell 
investigation contained the redacted names of certain legislators (the "redacted 
legislators"), who were allegedly implicated in unethical and illegal conduct.4 
On October 1, 2014, Pascoe sent Wilson an email referencing a discussion they 
had the night before, and stating he believed the redacted legislators should be 
investigated as part of "any corruption probe on the legislature."   
On October 2, 2014, Wilson emailed Chief Deputy Attorney General John 
McIntosh ("McIntosh") with Pascoe's email attached.5  In his email to McIntosh, 
Wilson stated, "As this office moves forward with this investigation there might be 
inherent conflicts between myself and members of the house . . . .  Because certain 
conflicts might exist I want you to take over as supervising prosecutor. . . .  Please 
ensure that I am firewalled from any involvement in that specific instance. . . ."  By 
email the same day, McIntosh accepted the designation as supervising prosecutor.  
McIntosh further assured Wilson that per his wishes, Wilson would be firewalled 
. . . an issue of fact shall arise . . . , or whenever the determination of any question 
of fact shall be necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon the 
Supreme Court, the court may frame an issue therein and certify the same to the 
circuit court . . . ."); Sanford v. S.C. State Ethics Comm'n, 385 S.C. 483, 497, 685 
S.E.2d 600, 607, opinion clarified, 386 S.C. 274, 688 S.E.2d 120 (2009).
2 See Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Singleton By & Through Singleton, 316 S.C. 5, 10, 
446 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1994) (citing Martin v. Cantrell, 225 S.C. 140, 81 S.E.2d 37 
(1954) (declaratory judgment)); 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 405 (2016) (mandamus).    
3 Harrell is the former Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives.  
On October 23, 2014, Harrell pled guilty and resigned from office. 
4 At the time Pascoe was designated the prosecutor in the Harrell matter, a state 
grand jury had already been impaneled.  No issue concerning the validity of 
Pascoe's authority in that matter is before the Court. 
5 The email CC'd Solicitor General Bob Cook ("Cook"). 
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from any involvement in the matter.   
It is unclear from the evidence before this Court whether the initial Harrell 
investigation led to further investigations beyond that of the redacted legislators.  
The exhibits before this Court further do not contain any indication the Attorney 
General's Office itself investigated or pursued the redacted legislators matter after 
October 2, 2014, although later correspondence discussed infra indicate SLED was
conducting an ongoing investigation after that date into these individuals.  The
correspondence between Wilson and McIntosh appear to be internal, and there is 
no evidence the content of the emails was made available to Pascoe or anyone 
outside the Attorney General's Office.  The exhibits reflect the next communication 
regarding the redacted legislators matter was in July 2015.
On July 17, 2015, McIntosh wrote a letter to the Chief of the South Carolina Law 
Enforcement Division, Mark Keel ("Chief Keel"), asking he forward the SLED 
report resulting from the investigation into the redacted legislators to Pascoe "for a 
prosecutive decision." The letter further stated, "As you are aware, the Attorney 
General recused this office from the legislative members in the redacted portions of 
the SLED report but has not recused this office from any other matters" (emphasis 
supplied). From this language, we conclude that SLED may have been 
investigating matters related to the Harrell probe aside from those involving the 
redacted legislators.
Chief Keel has provided an affidavit to this Court to the effect that his 
understanding of the July 17, 2015, letter was that the Attorney General's Office 
had thereafter recused itself from any involvement in the redacted legislators 
matter, and that SLED was to deal exclusively with Pascoe.  Chief Keel further 
states that in accord with his understanding, after the July 17, 2015, letter, he and 
SLED in fact dealt exclusively with Pascoe in the matter, and at no point was any 
information or evidence concerning the redacted legislators investigation shared 
with the Attorney General's Office. 
On July 24, 2015, McIntosh's July 17, 2015, letter was forwarded to Pascoe by 
Assistant Deputy Attorney General S. Creighton Waters ("Waters") as a scanned 
attachment to an email.  Also attached to the Waters email was a scanned letter 
from Waters to Pascoe, stating:  
As you are aware, several months ago the Attorney 
General firewalled himself from any involvement into the 
15 

  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
                                        
 
 
investigation of certain individuals covered in the still-
redacted portion of the SLED report. . . .  That portion of 
the investigation still remains open. . . .  I am writing to 
let you know that out of an abundance of caution, 
[McIntosh] sent [Keel] a letter . . . asking that agency 
forward to you the results of any further investigation. . . 
. 
The body of the email further stated Pascoe and SLED were to make the decision 
regarding whether redacted portions of the SLED report should be released to the 
media. This July 2015, correspondence notifying Pascoe he had been granted 
authority over the redacted legislators matter also informs Pascoe that the Attorney 
General's Office was recused.  
On July 27, 2015, Pascoe responded to Waters' email, stating:
I will probably give you a call later today or in the 
morning for some clarification, but my understanding 
from the two letters you sent me6 is that the Attorney 
General is asking that I make a prosecutorial decision on 
the redacted matters of the SLED report. . . . I assume 
further investigation was conducted on the redacted 
matters that I am not privy to as of yet.  I may also need 
to conduct further investigations into those matters.   
Given the status of the individuals who were the subject of this investigation, and 
the fact that it arose out of the state grand jury investigation of then Speaker 
Harrell, it may be inferred that further investigation into the redacted legislators 
matter at some juncture might warrant the impaneling of a state grand jury.    
We have no evidence of communication between Pascoe and anyone at the 
Attorney General's Office from July 2015 to September 2015.  However, by mid-
September 2015, the exhibits reflect disharmony between Pascoe and individuals 
in the Attorney General's Office, apparently precipitated by media leaks regarding 
the redacted legislators investigation, and the fact that Solicitor General Cook had 
6 Presumably, Pascoe is referring to the July 17, 2015, letter from McIntosh to 
Chief Keel, and the July 24, 2015, letter from Waters to Pascoe, both of which 
were attached to the email sent by Waters on July 24, 2015. 
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been in contact with an attorney representing one of the redacted legislators.   
On September 17, 2015, McIntosh sent Pascoe a letter noting the Attorney 
General's Office had possessed the SLED report containing the redacted legislators' 
names for two years—indicating the report was generated during the Harrell 
investigation—and that no portion thereof was leaked until after Pascoe was asked 
to make a "prosecutorial decision."  The letter then states, "[D]uring the past ten 
months, there has been considerable discussion back and forth between this office 
and law enforcement, in which additional questions have been raised.  The length 
of the inquiry has thus necessarily been prolonged by these additional questions."  
The letter concludes with a reminder that the public must have confidence in the 
integrity of the criminal process, and that the public should have full disclosure of 
all redacted information in the SLED report at the earliest appropriate time. 
A number of questions are raised by McIntosh's September 17, 2015, letter.  
Principally, the nature of the Attorney General's Office's ten month "inquiry" is 
unclear, though exhibits indicate the Attorney General's Office may have been 
conducting a separate investigation related to information contained in the Harrell 
SLED report, but unrelated to the redacted legislators matter. 
On September 25, 2015, Pascoe responded by letter to McIntosh, writing: 
I ask that your office not interfere in this investigation 
any further unless I ask for your assistance. . . .  [I]t is my
understanding from my discussions with SLED that your 
office conducted no further investigation into the matters 
after my October 1, 2014 email. . . .  The Attorney 
General's Office has a very clear conflict of interest in 
this matter.  If the public is to have confidence in the 
integrity of the criminal process in this case, it is 
imperative that the Attorney General's Office recuse 
itself. . . . [Y]our letter does nothing but heighten my 
concern that the Attorney General's Office continues to 
work behind the scenes in an investigation for which you 
claim a conflict of interest (emphasis supplied). 
On September 27, 2015, Cook emailed Pascoe.  In that email, Cook stated he was 
"stunned" at the contents of Pascoe's September 25, 2015, letter to McIntosh.  
Cook then stated: 
17 

  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
[W]e all understood perfectly well that the Office had no 
role in the [redacted name] matter. [McIntosh] and I had 
discussed sending it to you since you were already 
involved in Harrell.  Our concern was the integrity of the 
process, (so why would we interfere in that decision 
afterwards?) The [Attorney General], as Chief 
Prosecutor, always retains authority over the integrity of 
a criminal investigation even in a matter in which he is 
not involved (emphasis supplied). 
Cook concluded, "I don't know how I or we were interfering with your 
investigation or decision . . . . I am offended that you think I would interfere in 
your case" (emphasis supplied).
From this exchange, it appears the common understanding was that Pascoe had full 
control of the redacted legislators matter to the exclusion of the Attorney General's 
Office. Cook's email suggests the Attorney General's Office's sole concern was the 
"integrity" of the investigation—ensuring no one involved was leaking information 
to the media.  Protecting "the integrity of the process" appears to be Cook's 
justification for communicating with the attorney representing one of the redacted 
legislators.
On September 30, 2015, McIntosh wrote Pascoe a letter stating there was no basis 
for suggesting the Attorney General's Office was "interfering with [Pascoe's]
investigation" (emphasis supplied), and further asserting:
I also take exception to your statement that the Attorney 
General's Office has a very clear conflict of interest in 
this matter.  I am unaware of any conflict which I have, 
but out of an abundance of caution, the specific portions 
of the SLED report regarding the interview with 
[redacted name] were referred to you for handling as you 
deem appropriate. I also take exception to your 
statement that the Attorney General's Office continues to 
work behind the scenes in an investigation which you 
claim a conflict of interest.  I can assure you that this 
office is not doing any such thing. . . . (emphasis 
supplied). 
18 

  
  
 
 
                                        
   
 
 
This exhibit represents the first instance anyone in the Attorney General's Office 
"take[s] exception" to the unequivocal representations made in the July 2015, 
correspondence that the Attorney General's Office was recused due to a conflict of 
interest. While the September 30, 2015, letter denies the assertion that the 
Attorney General's Office has a "very clear" conflict of interest, McIntosh seems to 
base this on his personal lack of an actual conflict.  Further, the letter does not state 
that the Attorney General's Office is not recused.  Moreover, the letter goes on to 
state the entire case had been assigned to Pascoe for "handling as [he] deem[ed] 
appropriate." 
By October 21, 2015, the tension appears to have dissipated as evidenced by an 
email from Pascoe to Cook.  In the email, Pascoe referenced a meeting he had that 
day with McIntosh and Cook, and stated, "I am very grateful that you 
recommended we sit down and discuss our issues.  As it turns out, we have no 
'issues' and we are on the same page. . . . "  Nothing in the email or subsequent 
communications indicate what was discussed at the meeting, or what the mutual 
understanding entailed.  The email further requested advisory opinions7 on two 
issues related to the redacted legislators investigation.8 
7 See Alan Wilson South Carolina Attorney General, http://www.scag.gov/opinions
(last visited July 13, 2016) ("By statute, the Governor, members of the General 
Assembly, other elected government officials, state agencies, or people appointed 
to serve on boards and commissions are entitled to legal advice from the Attorney 
General’s Office. The Attorney General also issues legal opinions to certain local 
officials. An Attorney General’s opinion is thus a written public document 
responding to a specific legal question asked by these elected or appointed 
government officials.  All opinions have been reviewed by the Opinions Section 
and represent the highest standards of research. An Attorney General’s opinion 
attempts to resolve questions of law as the author believes a court would decide the 
issue. Unlike a court, however, Attorney General opinions cannot decide factual 
disputes."). 
8 Specifically, the email requested an opinion as to: 
1. Whether it is a violation of South Carolina law for a 
Member of the General Assembly to use his own 
campaign funds to pay for campaign services performed 
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On December 11, 2015, Cook emailed Pascoe the Attorney General opinion 
covering the issues "as thoroughly as possible."  There is no indication in the 
exhibits filed with this Court of any further communication between Pascoe and 
the Attorney General's Office until March 2016.
In February 2016, having determined in conjunction with Pascoe that a state grand 
jury investigation into the redacted legislators matter was necessary, Chief Keel 
sent a SLED agent to the Attorney General's Office to obtain templates for a state 
grand jury initiation from SLED Lieutenant Pete Logan ("Lt. Logan"), whose 
office was located within the state grand jury division of the Attorney General's 
Office. According to an affidavit by Robert E. Bogan ("Bogan")—a former 
prosecutor at the Attorney General's Office and assistant to Pascoe in the 
investigation of the redacted legislators matter—Bogan called Lt. Logan on or 
about February 12, 2016, to "get the format of the state grand jury initiation 
paperwork." Bogan asserts he did not disclose to Lt. Logan the subject of the 
investigation, only that he was assisting Pascoe.  Bogan claims Lt. Logan assumed 
which investigation Bogan was referencing, and replied that the Attorney General 
did not think it was an appropriate state grand jury case.  It does not appear from
the exhibits that the templates were supplied.     
In March 2016, Pascoe and Chief Keel signed the authorization to initiate a state 
grand jury proceeding.9  The initiation memorandum stated the Attorney General's 
Office was recused from making a prosecutive decision, and such authority was 
conferred upon Pascoe. On March 18, 2016, presiding judge Clifton Newman met 
with Pascoe and state grand jury clerk Parks.  Judge Newman acknowledged his 
notification of the state grand jury initiation by signing the memorandum.10  Parks 
by a business in which the Member or a member of the 
Member's family has an economic interest, and 
 
2. Whether it is a violation for a South Carolina House 
Majority Leader to cause or influence the House 
Legislative Caucus to hire and pay a business in which 
the Majority Leader has an economic interest.   
9  See S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1630(B) (Supp. 2015).  
 
10 South Carolina Code Ann. § 14-7-1630(B) (Supp. 2015) states, "the Attorney 
General may notify in writing to the chief administrative judge for general sessions 
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then administered the oath of secrecy to Pascoe, and agreed to administer the oath
to select members of his staff at a later date.  Parks also signed subpoenas at 
Pascoe's request.   
On March 22, 2016, McIntosh and Cook met with Chief Keel and expressed 
concern as to Pascoe's authority to initiate a state grand jury investigation.  
According to Chief Keel's affidavit, when he asked McIntosh why neither he nor 
Pascoe were contacted to discuss these concerns when he sent a SLED agent three 
weeks earlier to obtain the initiation templates, McIntosh responded he "didn't 
respond to rumors and didn't know why he should call Solicitor Pascoe."  
On March 24, 2016, Parks notified Pascoe via email he would not administer the 
state grand jury secrecy oath to Pascoe's staff, and would no longer issue 
subpoenas. In his affidavit, Parks explains he originally cooperated with the state 
grand jury initiation because he was under the impression the proceeding was 
authorized based on the language of the initiation memorandum, and Judge 
Newman's acknowledgment.       
On March 25, 2016, Pascoe filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus in this Court, 
asking the Court command Parks: (1) issue the oath of secrecy to Pascoe's staff 
involved in the state grand jury investigation; (2) issue subpoenas as required; and 
(3) "perform all other necessary and proper duties required by his office."  This 
Court granted Pascoe's petition for original jurisdiction to address the merits of the 
mandamus action. 
On March 28, 2016, McIntosh sent a letter to Pascoe purportedly terminating all 
authority delegated to Pascoe "on July 17 and July 24, 2015," because of Pascoe's 
attempt to "unlawfully" initiate a state grand jury investigation.  In his letter, 
McIntosh stated, "[Y]ou were given full power to prosecute this matter at the local 
level if you deemed such action to be appropriate.  However, rather than seeking 
explicit authority for a State Grand Jury investigation, you sought to initiate that 
investigation surreptitiously with respect to this office" (emphasis supplied). 
It is not clear what this "local level" language is meant to suggest.  However, 
nothing in the exhibits before this Court suggests that Pascoe's authority in the 
redacted legislators matter did not include all the power of the Attorney General, 
in the judicial circuit in which he seeks to impanel a state grand jury that a state 
grand jury investigation is being initiated." 
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including the impaneling of a state grand jury.   
On March 29, 2016, by letter, McIntosh purported to "designate" Fifth Circuit 
Solicitor Dan Johnson to replace Pascoe, assuring, "The Attorney General has 
authorized me to say that should you need any investigative tools, including the 
State Grand Jury, please let me know and you will be given that authority"11  
(emphasis supplied). 
On March 30, 2016, Pascoe filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with this Court, 
seeking the Court declare: (1) Attorney General Alan Wilson recused himself and 
his office from the investigation and prosecution of the redacted legislators matter; 
(2) the recusal was full, final, and irrevocable "leaving no role for [Wilson] or his 
Office in the matter"; (3) in so doing, Wilson exercised his statutory authority to 
vest Pascoe with the legal authority to act as the designee of the Attorney General 
imbued with the powers of that office; (4) Wilson's attempt to direct Clerk Parks in 
this matter was an ultra vires act; (5) Wilson's attempt to revoke Pascoe's 
designation in this matter was an ultra vires act; (6) Wilson's attempt to designate 
Fifth Circuit Solicitor Dan Johnson to investigate and prosecute this matter was an 
ultra vires act; and (7) Wilson and his office must cease and desist from any 
further involvement in this matter and act in strict accordance with the Court's 
judgment concerning the law of recusal.  We granted Pascoe's petition for original 
jurisdiction to address the merits of the declaratory judgment action.   
 
LAW/ANALYSIS  
 
As mentioned supra, because these cases are being heard in the Court's original 
jurisdiction, the Court sits as both the finder of fact and finder of law.12  We further 
note that in our view, the present dispute reflects the sincere desire of the parties to 
ensure the redacted legislators investigation is carried out pursuant to the laws of 
this state. 
On the merits, as discussed infra, while some evidence weighs against Pascoe's 
 
                                        
 
 
 
11 Dan Johnson declined to accept the designation pending the outcome of the 
current litigation. 
12 See § 14-3-340; Sanford, 385 S.C. at 497, 685 S.E.2d at 607. 
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position, we conclude Pascoe has met his burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence he was vested with the authority to act as the Attorney General in the 
redacted legislators matter, and that this authority necessarily included the power 
to initiate a state grand jury investigation.  We further conclude McIntosh's attempt 
to terminate Pascoe was not effective.  Given these determinations, we find it 
unnecessary to issue a writ of mandamus as we expect the parties will act in 
accordance with this decision. 
Pascoe has the burden of proving his cases by a preponderance of the evidence.  
See Vermont Mut. Ins. Co., 316 S.C. at 10, 446 S.E.2d at 421 (citing Martin v. 
Cantrell, 225 S.C. 140, 81 S.E.2d 37 (1954) (declaratory judgment)); 55 C.J.S. 
Mandamus § 405 (2016) (mandamus).  A preponderance of the evidence is 
evidence which convinces the fact finder as to its truth.  Gorecki v. Gorecki, 387 
S.C. 626, 633, 693 S.E.2d 419, 422 (Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted). 
Both Pascoe and Wilson argue any transfer of authority was governed by S.C. 
Code Ann. §§ 14-7-1650 et seq. (Supps. 2014 & 2015). We disagree, and find the 
transfers of authority were not governed by the State Grand Jury Act. 
Article 15 of Chapter 7 of Title 14 of the South Carolina Code contains the State 
Grand Jury Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1600 (Supps. 2014 & 2015).  Regarding 
the October 2014, Wilson recusal and subsequent transfer of authority to McIntosh, 
the version of the State Grand Jury Act effective at that time addressed only the 
Attorney General's "disqualification"13 after the state grand jury initiation process 
had begun. See S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1650(C)(2) (Supp. 2014); see also, e.g., Ex 
parte Harrell, 409 S.C. 60, 760 S.E.2d 808 (2014).  More to the point, § 14-7-
1650(C)(2), stated, "[I]n the case of the Attorney General's disqualification, the 
matter shall be referred to a solicitor for investigation and prosecution.  Any doubt
regarding disqualification shall be resolved by the presiding judge of the state 
grand jury" (emphasis supplied). The fact that disqualification disputes were to be 
13 This version of the statute did not contemplate recusal or voluntary/involuntary 
removal. It only contemplated disqualification "[w]here it is determined that a 
conflict of interest" exists. See § 14-7-1650 (Supp. 2014). 
The content of subsection (C)(2) was amended shortly thereafter effective June 3, 
2015. 
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resolved by the judge presiding over the state grand jury proceeding further 
demonstrates the statute only applied to removal of the Attorney General by 
disqualification after the state grand jury initiation process had begun.   
The Wilson recusal and transfer of authority to McIntosh occurred outside the 
context of a state grand jury proceeding, and, therefore, it occurred outside of the 
State Grand Jury Act. 
Likewise, we find the transfer of authority from McIntosh to Pascoe was not 
governed by the State Grand Jury Act.  The applicable version of § 14-7-1650,14 
effective at the time of the July 2015, transfer of authority to Pascoe, only applies 
to recusal or disqualification post-initiation of the state grand jury investigation.  
Specifically, §14-7-1650(C), states, in pertinent part:
When the Attorney General determines that he should 
recuse himself from participation in a state grand jury 
investigation and prosecution, the Attorney General may 
either refer the matter to a solicitor for investigation and 
prosecution, or remove himself entirely from any 
involvement in the case and designate a prosecutor to
assume his functions and duties pursuant to this article. . . 
. (emphasis supplied).   
This statute, like the version effective in October 2014, addresses a circumstance in
which there is an ongoing state grand jury proceeding.  Accordingly, we hold the 
October 2, 2014, transfer of authority to McIntosh, and the July 17, and 24, 2015, 
transfer of authority to Pascoe, are not governed by any provision of the State 
Grand Jury Act. 
Further, we find the preponderance of the evidence supports two conclusions: that 
Wilson unequivocally recused himself from any aspect of the redacted legislators 
investigation and delegated all authority vested in the elected Attorney General to 
McIntosh in the October 2, 2014, letter asking that McIntosh "take over as 
14 Effective June 3, 2015. Wilson submits he substantially influenced the statutory 
changes made to the State Grand Jury Act that became effective June 3, 2015.  
Among those changes is the recognition of the Attorney General's ability to recuse 
himself, as well as his ability to delegate his authority in whole or in part.  See § 
14-7-1650(C) (Supp. 2015).   
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supervising prosecutor"; and, subsequently, that McIntosh, acting as the Attorney 
General, recused himself and the Attorney General's Office from the redacted 
legislators investigation, and appointed Pascoe to act as the Attorney General 
vested with the Attorney General's power and authority for the purpose of that 
investigation in the July 2015, correspondence.15 See Gorecki, 387 S.C. at 633, 
693 S.E.2d at 422 (noting a preponderance of the evidence is evidence which 
convinces the fact finder as to its truth (citation omitted)). 
The initial correspondence from the Attorney General's Office to both Pascoe and 
Chief Keel in July 2015, stated, without reservation, that the Attorney General's 
Office was recused from the redacted legislators investigation, leaving only Pascoe 
as the state's highest prosecutor in that matter.16  Indeed, in his March 28, 2016, 
letter purporting to terminate Pascoe, McIntosh referred to the dates of July 17, and 
24, 2015, as the instances when Pascoe was delegated authority in the redacted 
legislators matter; the correspondence on those dates stated the Attorney General's 
Office was recused. Second, the exhibits demonstrate that high level officials at 
the Attorney General's Office repeatedly stated that the matter was solely within 
Pascoe's authority, referring to the matter as, inter alia, "your investigation or 
decision," "your investigation," and "your case."  Third, several communications 
maintained the Attorney General's Office was "out of it," and vehemently denied 
the Attorney General's Office at any point interfered with the redacted legislators 
investigation. Fourth, Cook's emails suggest the only authority remaining with the 
Attorney General's Offices was ensuring the "integrity" of the investigation, i.e., 
ensuring no one involved was leaking confidential information to the media.  And 
fifth, no correspondence indicated the Attorney General's Office retained any 
control over the redacted legislators investigation, or that Pascoe was acting at the 
Office's direction.  Specifically, there is no evidence McIntosh, Cook, or Waters 
requested an update or information as to the progress or contents of the 
15 Thus, Pascoe was acting as the Attorney General for the purpose of the redacted 
legislators matter fully vested with the authority of South Carolina Constitution 
Article V, § 24, and, therefore, is not in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 1-7-380 
(2005). 
16 We acknowledge that McIntosh's affidavit submits his July 17, 2015, letter was 
"in-artfully" drafted. Nonetheless, we find the words of that letter unequivocally 
conveyed to Pascoe the authority to act as the Attorney General in the redacted 
legislators matter.   
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investigation. To the contrary, McIntosh repeatedly reassured the investigation 
was exclusively under Pascoe's control, and that the Attorney General's Office had
not and would not interfere.17 
We further find of critical importance the fact that Chief Keel, a neutral witness, 
expressed in his affidavit his understanding was that since July 2015, the entire 
Attorney General's Office was recused from any further involvement in the 
investigation of the redacted legislators.  Chief Keel states that he had no contact or 
communication with the Attorney General's Office regarding the redacted 
legislators matter after July 17, 2015.  Chief Keel's affidavit further provides he 
worked exclusively with Pascoe on the investigation, and when the need for a state 
grand jury proceeding became apparent, he and Pascoe reviewed "letters and 
correspondences," [sic] and agreed initiation of a state grand jury was authorized 
by the July 17, 2015, letter. 
Further, prior to concerns being raised by individuals at the Attorney General's 
Office, Judge Newman and Clerk Parks accepted that Pascoe had the authority to 
act as the Attorney General in initiating the state grand jury investigation.  Parks' 
affidavit to this Court states he swore Pascoe into the state grand jury investigation 
in the presence of Judge Newman, and signed subpoenas at Pascoe's request, as he 
was "under the impression that the investigation was authorized."  Parks' affidavit 
explains that approximately one week later, on March 24, 2016, he sent a 
communication to Pascoe copying Judge Newman, explaining that due to myriad 
legal and procedural issues that had "surfaced," he would not be administering the 
oath to anyone involved in the case until the issues were resolved.18 
We find Pascoe has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Attorney 
General's Office in its entirety was recused from the redacted legislators 
17 It is for this reason we find the transfer of authority was not governed by any 
doctrine related to agency, which provides for degrees of control between a 
principal and an agent.  Rather, we find the preponderance of the evidence supports 
the conclusion that an unequivocal cession of authority occurred resulting in 
Pascoe maintaining the full authority of the Attorney General. 
18 Parks' actions gave rise to Pascoe's initial filing with this Court: the Petition for a 
Writ of Mandamus. 
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investigation, and Pascoe was vested with the full authority to act as the Attorney 
General for the purpose of the investigation.  
Wilson contends, however, that only the elected Attorney General may lawfully 
sign the authorization for a state grand jury investigation.
South Carolina Code Ann. § 14-7-1630(B) (Supp. 2015),19 states: 
 "When the Attorney General and the Chief of [SLED] 
consider a state grand jury necessary to enhance the 
effectiveness of investigative or prosecutorial procedures, 
the Attorney General may notify in writing to the chief 
administrative judge for general sessions in the judicial 
circuit in which he seeks to impanel a state grand jury 
that a state grand jury investigation is being initiated."   
Wilson asserts that pursuant to § 14-7-1630(B), and under all circumstances, 
regardless of any firewall or disqualification, the elected Attorney General 
personally is the sole individual authorized to initiate a state grand jury 
investigation. Specifically, Wilson argues his exclusive authority to initiate a state 
grand jury is non-delegable under § 14-7-1630(B), because other provisions of the 
State Grand Jury Act refer to the "Attorney General or his designee."  He contends 
that the absence of the term "designee" in the initiation statute should be read to 
require the Attorney General personally sign the state grand jury initiation request.  
We disagree. 
It is incontrovertible § 14-7-1630(B), requires the signature of the Attorney 
General in the authorization of a state grand jury investigation; however, we find 
the strict interpretation of the term "Attorney General"—to require the personal 
signature of the elected office holder—would lead to an absurd result.  See 
Kennedy v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 345 S.C. 339, 351, 549 S.E.2d 243, 249 (2001) (finding 
statutes should not be construed so as to lead to an absurd result (citation omitted)); 
Kiriakides v. United Artists Commc'ns, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 275, 440 S.E.2d 364, 
366 (1994) (citing Stackhouse v. Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs for Dillon Cnty., 86 S.C. 
419, 422, 68 S.E. 561, 562 (1910) (holding regardless of how plain the ordinary 
meaning of the words in a statute, courts will reject that meaning when to accept it 
19 This 2015 version of the statute was in effect in March, 2016, when the issue of 
Pascoe's authority arose. 
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would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not have been intended by the 
General Assembly)).   
Were we to hold that only the elected office holder is authorized to initiate a state 
grand jury investigation, then even where the Attorney General himself became the 
subject of an investigation, only he could initiate a state grand jury proceeding in 
the case against him.  We conclude such a holding would lead to an absurd result.  
See Kiriakides, 312 S.C. at 275, 440 S.E.2d at 366 (holding if possible, the court 
will construe a statute so as to escape an absurdity and carry the intention into 
effect (citation omitted)).  A similar absurd result would arise where the Attorney 
General resigned or was rendered incapacitated, the effect of which would be that 
no state grand jury could go forward pending the election of, and qualification of, 
his successor.  See id.  We find such absurd results could not have been intended 
by the General Assembly. See State v. Cnty. of Florence, 406 S.C. 169, 173, 749 
S.E.2d 516, 518 (2013) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is a court must 
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature"); Kiriakides, 312 S.C. at 
275, 440 S.E.2d at 366 (finding regardless of how plain the ordinary meaning of 
the words in a statute, courts will reject that meaning when to accept it would lead 
to a result so plainly absurd that it could not have been intended by the General 
Assembly).  
Further, we fail to see how a recused individual could authorize a state grand jury 
investigation having no knowledge of the facts or evidence in the case.  In the 
instant case, it remains unclear whether anyone at the Attorney General's Office 
has any information regarding the investigation of the redacted legislators.  To the 
contrary, according to Keel, no one at the Attorney General's Office was made 
privy to any information obtained by SLED relating to the redacted legislators 
investigation after July 17, 2015.  The facts of the investigation were known only 
by Keel, Pascoe, and their investigators.   
The purpose of § 14-7-1630(B), is to provide the mechanism for the initiation of a 
state grand jury proceeding. This responsibility should only be exercised by an 
individual with thorough knowledge of the investigation leading up to the request 
for a state grand jury. More to the point, how would an Attorney General 
firewalled from all aspects of an investigation possess the requisite knowledge as 
to whether subject matter jurisdiction lies with the state grand jury.  See, e.g., Ex 
parte Harrell, 409 S.C. at 70–71, 760 S.E.2d at 813 ("Relevant to this case, the 
subject matter jurisdiction of a state grand jury covers 'a crime, statutory, common 
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law or other, involving public corruption as defined in [s]ection 14-7-1615, a 
crime, statutory, common law or other, arising  out of or in connection with a 
crime involving public corruption . . . , and any attempt, aiding, abetting, 
solicitation, or conspiracy to commit a crime, statutory, common law or other, 
involving public corruption. . . .'" (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1630(A)(3) (Supp. 
2013))); see also § 14-7-1630(B) (requiring the individual seeking authorization of 
the state grand jury investigation "allege the type of offenses to be inquired into 
and, in the case of [certain offenses], must allege that these offense may be of a 
multicounty nature or have transpired or are transpiring or have significance in 
more than one county of the State."). 
As evidenced by the statute itself, a state grand jury proceeding is an investigatory 
tool which we find is available to the Attorney General or his designee vested with 
the authority over an investigation within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Act.  
See § 14-7-1630(B) (stating authorization of a state grand jury is proper where a 
state grand jury is necessary "to enhance the effectiveness of investigative or 
prosecutorial procedures" (emphasis supplied)); see also The Perils of Parallel 
Civil and Criminal Proceedings: A Primer, 10 No. 4 HEALTH LAW., 1, 4 (1998) 
("One of the government's most powerful investigatory tools is the grand jury"); cf. 
United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 419 (1983) (noting the concern of 
tempting prosecutors to manipulate the grand jury's "powerful investigative tools").  
Finally, nothing in the statute requires only the elected Attorney General may 
authorize a state grand jury investigation.   
We conclude the General Assembly intended that the individual acting with the 
authority of the Attorney General may lawfully seek to impanel a state grand jury. 
See Cnty. of Florence, 406 S.C. at 173, 749 S.E.2d at 518; Kiriakides, Inc., 312 
S.C. at 275, 440 S.E.2d at 366; cf. Matter of Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 
590 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1979).
Accordingly, since we find Pascoe was acting with the authority of the Attorney 
General when he signed the initiation of the state grand jury investigation, we hold 
the initiation was lawful and valid.  Because we find Pascoe lawfully authorized 
the initiation of the state grand jury investigation, the Attorney General's purported 
termination of Pascoe after the initiation of the state grand jury was ineffective. 
As to Pascoe's mandamus action, as noted supra, our rulings in the declaratory 
judgment action clarify the roles of the parties involved.  Therefore, we need not 
issue a writ of mandamus. 
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The Declaratory Judgment is therefore 
ISSUED 
BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.  FEW, J., dissenting in a 
separate opinion.
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JUSTICE FEW: The Attorney General makes two arguments of law in defense 
of his decision to fire Solicitor Pascoe.  First, he contends a statute forbids a 
solicitor from suing the Attorney General.  Second, he contends the South Carolina 
Constitution gives him the absolute authority to supervise all criminal litigation, 
and thus to remove an appointed prosecutor when he deems it appropriate.  
Because I believe both arguments are valid, and because I believe the 
constitutional argument renders irrelevant any factual finding except an actual 
conflict of interest on the part of the Attorney General, I would not follow the 
approach chosen by the majority.  Rather, I would instruct the presiding judge of 
the circuit court to answer this key factual question—whether the Attorney General
has an actual conflict of interest—after which the presiding judge may direct the 
proceedings accordingly. In all likelihood, the result would be the same.  
However, because I believe the law requires we follow a different procedure to 
reach that point, I respectfully dissent. 
South Carolina Code section 1-7-380 (2005) provides, "The several solicitors of 
the State shall not engage in litigation against the State or any of its departments."  
David M. Pascoe is a "solicitor," this is "litigation," and Pascoe "engaged" in it 
"against the State" by suing the Attorney General in this Court's original 
jurisdiction. Pursuant to the plain language of section 1-7-380, I would dismiss the 
action. The result of that dismissal would bring these issues before the presiding 
judge of the circuit court.20 
Article V, section 24 of the Constitution of South Carolina provides, "The Attorney 
General shall be the chief prosecuting officer of the State with authority to 
supervise the prosecution of all criminal cases in courts of record."  In my opinion, 
"the chief prosecuting officer of the State with authority to supervise the 
prosecution of all criminal cases" has the power to remove an appointed 
20 It makes little apparent sense that Pascoe cannot sue the Attorney General to
resolve these issues, but he may ask the presiding judge in a pending case to do so.
However, the language of section 1-7-380 is plain and unambiguous. See City of
Myrtle Beach v. Tourism Expenditure Review Comm., 407 S.C. 298, 304, 755 
S.E.2d 425, 428 (2014) ("The wisdom or folly of the Act is not for us to judge; we 
must enforce the Act as written."); Busby v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 280 
S.C. 330, 337, 312 S.E.2d 716, 720 (Ct. App. 1984) ("The responsibility for the 
justice or wisdom of legislation rests exclusively with the legislature, whether or 
not we agree with the laws it enacts."). 
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prosecutor—even one to whom he had previously given complete discretion for the 
prosecution. This constitutional authority should be subject only to (1) an express 
and unmistakable recusal of the office by the Attorney General himself—not by his 
assistants—with specific relinquishment of his article V, section 24 supervisory 
responsibility, or (2) the disqualification of the Attorney General by order of the 
court based on the Attorney General's concession or the court's finding of an actual 
conflict of interest. 
The words written by the Attorney General and his assistants in the various emails 
and letters may be clear, but what they intended—and the legal significance of 
what they wrote—is far from clear.  The majority has done a thorough job 
analyzing the evidence, and its findings of fact are adequately supported by the 
evidence.21  However, I do not agree that the majority's findings of fact are 
21 We have the authority to find facts in our original jurisdiction.  Sanford v. S.C. 
State Ethics Comm'n, 385 S.C. 483, 497, 685 S.E.2d 600, 607, opinion clarified, 
386 S.C. 274, 688 S.E.2d 120 (2009).  However, we have hardly ever done so.  In 
Sanford, the only case I have been able to find in which we made factual findings 
in our original jurisdiction, we examined the file from a State Ethics Commission 
investigation to determine whether a letter written by the Governor "constitute[d] a 
complete waiver of confidentiality" in the investigation.  385 S.C. at 493, 685 
S.E.2d at 605. In all other cases, we have used our original jurisdiction to resolve 
questions of law, and when fact-finding is necessary to determine the law, we have 
assigned the responsibility to find facts to a circuit court judge.  See S.C. Code 
Ann. § 14-3-340 (1977) ("Whenever in the course of any action or proceeding in 
the Supreme Court arising in the exercise of the original jurisdiction . . . an issue of
fact shall arise . . . , or whenever the determination of any question of fact shall be 
necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court, the 
court may frame an issue therein and certify the same to the circuit court . . . .").  
See also, e.g., Ex parte Smith, 407 S.C. 422, 422, 756 S.E.2d 386, 386 (2014) 
(stating "this Court granted the petition for original jurisdiction in this case and 
appointed the Honorable Clifton Newman to serve as special referee"); Roberts v. 
LaConey, 375 S.C. 97, 100, 650 S.E.2d 474, 475 (2007) (noting the Court 
"accepted this declaratory judgment matter in our original jurisdiction . . . [and] 
referred [it] to a Special Referee . . . to take evidence and issue a report containing 
proposed findings of fact "); City of Columbia v. Tindal, 43 S.C. 547, 554, 22 S.E. 
341, 344 (1895) (in an action "in the original jurisdiction of this court," stating, 
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sufficient to resolve this case.  First, the majority does not squarely address the key 
factual question in the case—the only factual question whose answer could 
disqualify the Attorney General without his consent—whether he actually has a 
conflict of interest. The Rules of Professional Conduct provide "a lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest."  
Rule 1.7, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR.  When an attorney has a conflict of interest, a 
court has the power to remove the attorney from the action.  See State v. Wilson, 
387 S.C. 597, 599, 693 S.E.2d 923, 924 (2010) (the circuit court removed an 
assistant solicitor due to a conflict of interest, but we found the order was not 
immediately appealable); State v. Justus, 392 S.C. 416, 419-20, 709 S.E.2d 668, 
670 (2011) (affirming the circuit court's removal of defense counsel due to a 
conflict of interest). The Attorney General told McIntosh he "might" have a 
conflict of interest; McIntosh later referred to a recusal, but did not state the 
Attorney General's or his actions were based on a conflict.  With no concession or 
finding of a conflict of interest, this Court should not prevent the Attorney General 
from exercising his constitutional responsibility to supervise criminal prosecution 
and his authority to remove a prosecutor when he deems it appropriate.   
Second, the majority places too much emphasis on the fact that the Attorney 
General gave Pascoe complete authority to prosecute the case.  This is an 
important fact, and I agree with the majority that he did it.  However, this fact does
not negate the Attorney General's supervisory responsibility under article V, 
section 24 of the constitution. The Attorney General's power to assign solicitors to 
prosecute cases derives from statute.  See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. 1-7-50 (2005) 
(stating the Attorney General must defend "any officer or employee of the State" 
and "[s]uch appearance may be by . . . any solicitor . . . when directed to do so by 
the Attorney General."); S.C. Code Ann. 1-7-320 (2005) ("Solicitors shall perform
the duty of the Attorney General . . . whenever they shall be . . . required to do so; 
and they shall assist the Attorney General . . . in all suits of prosecution in behalf of 
this State when . . . called upon by the Attorney General."); S.C. Code Ann. 1-7-
350 (2005) ("The several solicitors of the State shall, . . . as assigned by the 
Attorney General, represent in all matters, . . . [and] . . . they shall be subject to the 
call of the Attorney General, who shall have the exclusive right, in his discretion,
to so assign them in case of the incapacity of the local solicitor or otherwise.").  
"There being a necessity for some testimony, [the action] was referred, under an 
order from this court, to [a] special referee").
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This statutory grant of power is subject to the provisions of the constitution, and 
thus the use of the power to assign a solicitor to prosecute a case cannot amount to 
a relinquishment of the Attorney General's responsibility under the constitution to 
supervise all criminal cases.  
Third, the majority finds the Attorney General "unequivocally recused himself," 
and McIntosh and Waters made "unequivocal representations . . . in the July 2015 
correspondence" by which McIntosh "recused himself and the Attorney General's
Office." These are also important facts, and I cannot disagree with the majority 
that is what happened. However, I do not agree that either action was 
"unequivocal." Rather, the evidence is contradictory, and the subsequent actions of 
McIntosh, Cook, Waters, and Pascoe indicate none of them believed the Attorney 
General or McIntosh intended to relinquish the supervisory responsibilities set 
forth in article V, section 24.  This uncertainty is important to the constitutional 
analysis, as I believe this Court should not find that the Attorney General 
relinquished this responsibility unless the actions he took to do so were his own 
actions, and were, in fact, unequivocal.   
I will summarize some of the evidence to illustrate my point.  On October 2, 2014, 
the Attorney General wrote an email to McIntosh stating, "Please ensure that I am 
firewalled from any involvement in that specific instance" and "I want you to take 
over as supervising prosecutor."  In this email, the Attorney General placed 
McIntosh in charge of the case, thus intentionally keeping the office of the 
Attorney General involved in the investigation and prosecution.  As the majority 
finds, "McIntosh accepted the designation as supervising prosecutor."  The record 
before us does not contain any evidence of other action regarding recusal taken by 
the Attorney General himself after the October 2 email, and McIntosh appears to 
explain in an affidavit that the October 2 email was the only communication he 
received from the Attorney General on the subject.  Everything else relied on by 
the majority for its finding that the entire office was recused consists only of 
actions taken by McIntosh, Cook, or Waters.  In particular, the July 2015 
correspondence came from McIntosh and Waters—not directly from the Attorney 
General.   
In addition, the July 2015 correspondence is internally inconsistent as to whether 
the office was recused. McIntosh's July 17 letter was written to Chief Keel 
referencing what appears to be a follow-up investigation of persons mentioned in 
the SLED report. Despite the "recused this office" statement, McIntosh 
34 

  
 
 
 
                                        
    
  
  
 
    
   
  
   
  
  
  
  
 
 
"request[ed] that, upon completion of the investigation of those persons, the report 
be forwarded" to Pascoe.  The action of directing the future delivery of an 
uncompleted report is inconsistent with the office being recused.   
Moreover, the "recused this office" statement is inconsistent with the Attorney 
General putting McIntosh in charge by the October 2, 2014 email, particularly his 
telling McIntosh to "ensure that I am firewalled."  The July 24 letter from Waters 
to Pascoe also states the Attorney General "firewalled" himself.  The act of 
firewalling might be equivalent to the recusal of an individual, but it is the opposite 
of recusing an entire office.22  The purpose of a firewall is to enable the rest of an 
office to continue working on the matter despite one lawyer's conflict.  Finally, like 
McIntosh's July 17 letter, Waters' letter shows the continued involvement of the 
office because it informs Pascoe that at McIntosh's direction he will receive the
"results of any further investigation" from Chief Keel.   
Further, McIntosh, Cook, and Waters continued their involvement in the case long 
after July. McIntosh wrote Pascoe on September 17, 2015 describing 
"considerable discussion" between the Attorney General's office and law 
enforcement. Apparently exercising the "supervising prosecutor" authority the 
Attorney General gave him in October 2014, McIntosh admonished Pascoe "the 
public must have every confidence that the integrity of the criminal process is 
protected." On September 27, 2015, Cook emailed Pascoe stating, "The [Attorney 
22 The term "firewall" is used to describe a hypothetical barrier placed between a
lawyer and the remainder of the lawyer's firm or office to prevent the lawyer's
conflict of interest from being imputed to the entire organization. See, e.g., In re 
Shared Memory Graphics LLC, 659 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("Nor is it 
disputed that after Cooper joined the law firm of Floyd and Buss, the firm was and
is representing parties adverse to [his former client]. The firm did not take any
steps to exclude Cooper from the firm's activities in this lawsuit; there is no
representation that the traditional 'firewall' was erected.").  The term "firewalled" is
synonymous with "screened" in our Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule  
1.0(n), RPC, Rule 407, SCRCP (defining "Screened" as "the isolation of a lawyer
from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures 
within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect 
information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or 
other law"). 
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General], as Chief Prosecutor, always retains authority over that integrity of a 
criminal investigation even in a matter in which he is not involved."  On September
30, 2015, McIntosh wrote a letter to Pascoe in which he denied the office has a 
conflict of interest and offered to "assist you any way possible as to legal 
research." An office does not do legal research in a matter as to which the office is 
unequivocally recused. 
Pascoe accepted the involvement of the Attorney General's office after the July 
2015 correspondence.  For example, Pascoe emailed Creighton Waters on July 27, 
2015 stating, "I will . . . call later today or in the morning for some clarification."  
On September 15, 2015, Pascoe emailed Cook asking if the Attorney General's 
office ever dealt with a legal issue Pascoe faced in his investigation of the redacted 
portions of the SLED report. There is considerable email correspondence between 
Pascoe and Cook in September, much of which is arguably unrelated to the 
investigation. On October 21 and 23, 2015, however, Pascoe wrote Cook and 
officially requested two advisory opinions on matters related directly to the 
investigation.23  Pascoe stated, "Bob, I want to thank you for taking the time to 
meet with me last week. I always value your opinion and advice.  Per our
discussion, I need your opinion on two issues dealing with South Carolina Code 
Section 8-13-700," which is entitled in part, "Use of official position or office for 
financial gain"—the subject of Pascoe's investigation.  On November 16, 2015, 
Pascoe emailed Cook asking, "I was just wondering if you are making any 
pro[gress] on the issues I asked you to look into and give me an opinion."  Cook 
delivered his opinion on December 11, 2015 via email.  Pascoe responded, "I will 
call you next week after I have an opportunity to review it . . . so I can pick your 
brain." 
Finally, Pascoe wrote McIntosh on September 25, 2015 and stated "it is imperative 
that the Attorney General's Office recuse itself," indicating Pascoe did not believe 
the office had already done so.  These facts and others are inconsistent with a 
finding that the Attorney General and McIntosh intentionally and unequivocally 
relinquished the duty to supervise this case under article V, section 24 of the 
constitution. 
In my opinion, the lack of action by the Attorney General himself in recusing the 
office, the confusion as to whether the July 2015 correspondence was in fact a 
23 See supra note 8. 
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recusal of the office, and the subsequent behavior of those involved indicating they 
did not think so are critical to the analysis of whether the Attorney General 
retained or relinquished his constitutional responsibility under article V, section 24.  
If we are going to find that the Attorney General forfeited his constitutional duty to 
supervise all criminal prosecutions, we ought to do so only on the basis of the 
Attorney General's own actions that are in fact clear.  By allowing the imprecise 
and internally inconsistent writing of two assistants—months after the Attorney 
General ceased communication with them about the case—to constitute the 
forfeiture of the responsibilities of a constitutional officer, we set a dangerous 
precedent. This and other constitutional responsibilities are too important for this 
Court to allow their forfeiture on imprecise and inconsistent statements made by 
unelected subordinates to constitutional officers. 
By requiring the presiding judge of the circuit court to answer the key factual 
question of whether the Attorney General has an actual conflict of interest, and 
permitting the presiding judge to thereafter direct the proceedings accordingly, we 
comply with section 1-7-380, we enable a more precise fact-finding inquiry than 
this Court can conduct on the record before us, and we ensure the responsibility 
imposed on the Attorney General by article V, section 24 of the constitution to 
"supervise the prosecution of all criminal cases" is honored unless he actually has a 
conflict of interest that prevents him from doing so. See also S.C. Code Ann. § 14-
7-1650(C)(2) (Supp. 2014) ("Any doubt regarding disqualification [of the Attorney 
General] shall be resolved by the presiding judge of the state grand jury.").  I 
respectfully argue that this is the procedure we should follow.
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PER CURIAM: We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' 
opinion in State v. Douglas, 411 S.C. 307, 768 S.E.2d 232 (2014). We now 
dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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LOCKEMY, C.J.:  In this declaratory judgment action, the South Carolina 
Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (the Association) appeals 
the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Janette Buchanan and 
Shana Smallwood, individually and as co-personal representatives of the estate of 
James Buchanan (Respondents).  On appeal, the Association argues the trial court 
erred in finding the Association's statutory offset of $376,622 should be deducted 
from the claimant's total amount of stipulated damages of $800,000 rather than the 
Association's mandatory statutory claim limit of $300,000.  We affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 7, 2008, James Buchanan was involved in a motor vehicle accident in 
Bamberg, South Carolina, caused by a vehicle driven by Eddie Best and owned by 
Travis Scott. Scott's vehicle was insured for one million dollars by AequiCap 
Insurance Company (AequiCap). Mr. Buchanan died at the scene of the accident.  
Mrs. Buchanan, individually and as the personal representative of Mr. Buchanan's 
estate, initiated a wrongful death lawsuit in Bamberg County against Best and 
Scott, both of whom were South Carolina residents.  During the pendency of the 
wrongful death action, a Florida court declared AequiCap insolvent.  As a result of 
AequiCap's insolvency, the Association assumed management of the claims
against AequiCap's South Carolina insureds pursuant to the South Carolina 
Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association Act (the Act).1 
Mrs. Buchanan, Scott, and Best reached a settlement in the wrongful death lawsuit, 
and the trial court approved the settlement on February 24, 2014.  As part of the 
settlement agreement, the parties stipulated that Mrs. Buchanan sustained $800,000 
in damages. Respondents recovered a total of $376,622 from workers'
compensation benefits and the codefendants' insurance. 
On April 11, 2013, Respondents filed an action against the Association for a 
declaration that the Association must pay $300,000, the limit of its exposure under 
S.C. Code Ann. § 38-31-60 (2015). Respondents asserted the balance due to them 
after offsetting their $376,622 recovery was $423,378, which exceeded the 
statutory limit. The Association answered, claiming the credit for the $376,622 
already received should be applied to its $300,000 statutory cap, which would 
1 See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 38-31-10 through -170 (2015). 
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reduce its obligation to zero. The Association and Respondents filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.  
On May 28, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the cross-motions.  On 
September 9, 2014, the trial court granted Respondents' summary judgment motion 
and denied the Association's motion.  In its order, the trial court found the plain 
language of the Act mandated that the Association pay Respondents $300,000.  
The trial court found Respondents' "covered claim" under the AequiCap policy was 
$800,000, to which an offset of $376,622 would be applied under section 38-31-
100(1) of the South Carolina Code (2015), leaving a balance of $423,378 on the 
covered claim.  The trial court held the Association's obligation to pay the balance 
due on the claim was then limited by the $300,000 cap set forth in section 38-31-
60. The Association filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court 
denied.  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Where cross motions for summary judgment are filed, the parties concede the 
issue before us should be decided as a matter of law."  Wiegand v. U.S. Auto. Ass'n, 
391 S.C. 159, 163, 705 S.E.2d 432, 434 (2011).  "Determining the proper 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this Court reviews questions of 
law de novo." Lambries v. Saluda Cty. Council, 409 S.C. 1, 7, 760 S.E.2d 785, 
788 (2014) (quoting Town of Summerville v. City of N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 
110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008)). "In a case raising a novel issue of law regarding 
the interpretation of a statute, the appellate court is free to decide the question with 
no particular deference to the lower court."  Id. at 7−8, 760 S.E.2d at 788 (quoting 
Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370 S.C. 452, 466, 636 S.E.2d 598, 
605 (2006)). "The appellate court is free to decide the question based on its 
assessment of which interpretation and reasoning would best comport with the law 
and public policies of this state and the Court's sense of law, justice, and right."  Id. 
at 8, 760 S.E.2d at 788 (quoting Sloan, 380 S.C. at 467, 636 S.E.2d at 605−06)).
LAW/ANALYSIS
The Association argues the Act unambiguously requires that any offset be 
deducted from the Association's $300,000 statutory claim limit rather than a 
claimant's total amount of damages on a covered claim.  We disagree. 
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"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent 
of the legislature." Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 
(2000). "Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the 
meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute."  Id. "Where the statute's language is 
plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of 
statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another 
meaning." Id.  "What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the 
best evidence of the legislative intent or will.  Therefore, the courts are bound to 
give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature."  Id. (quoting Norman J. 
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.03 at 94 (5th ed. 1992)). "All rules 
of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legislative intent must 
prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language 
must be construed in light of the intended purpose of the statute."  McClanahan v. 
Richland Cty. Council, 350 S.C. 433, 438, 567 S.E.2d 240, 242 (2002).
"It is axiomatic that 'words in a statute must be construed in context,' and 'the 
meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words 
associated with them in the statute.'"  Hudson ex rel. Hudson v. Lancaster 
Convalescent Ctr., 407 S.C. 112, 124, 754 S.E.2d 486, 492 (2014) (quoting Eagle 
Container Co., LLC v. Cty. of Newberry, 379 S.C. 564, 570, 666 S.E.2d 892, 895 
(2008)). "Further, statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are part of 
the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given 
effect, if it can be done by any reasonable construction."  Id. at 124−25, 754 S.E.2d 
at 492−93. 
"[The Association] is a last resort insurer created by the legislature to protect 
consumers in the event that their insurer becomes insolvent."  Id. at 124, 754 
S.E.2d at 492. Section 38-31-60(b) states the Association "is considered the 
insurer to the extent of its obligation on the covered claims and, to this extent, has 
all rights, duties, and obligations of the insolvent insurer as if the insurer had not 
become insolvent."  "Because [the Association] is a creature of statute, its duties, 
liabilities, and obligations are controlled by the terms and conditions set forth in 
the Act."  S.C. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Brock, 410 S.C. 361, 365−66, 764 
S.E.2d 920, 922 (2014). "Pursuant to the Act, [the Association] must pay certain 
'covered claims,' as the term is defined in section 38-31-20(8) [of the South 
Carolina Code (2015)]." Id. at 366, 764 S.E.2d at 922.  A "covered claim" is "an 
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unpaid claim . . . which arises out of and is within the coverage and is subject to 
the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which this chapter applies issued by 
an insurer, if the insurer is an insolvent insurer."  § 38-31-20(8).  However, the 
Association's obligation to pay covered claims "includes only the amount each 
covered claim is in excess of two hundred fifty dollars and is less than three 
hundred thousand dollars."  S.C. Code Ann. § 38-31-60(a)(iv) (2015). 
"As a condition precedent to recovery from [the Association], a claimant is 
required to first exhaust all available coverage from solvent insurers, and [the 
Association] is allowed to offset the full limits of such other coverage against its 
obligations under the Act." Brock, 410 S.C. at 366, 764 S.E.2d at 922.  Regarding 
the exhaustion and offset of coverage from solvent insurers, section 38-31-100(1) 
provides as follows:
A person, having a claim under an insurance policy, 
whether or not it is a policy issued by a member insurer, 
and the claim under such other policy arises from the 
same facts, injury, or loss that gave rise to the covered 
claim against the association, is required to first exhaust 
all coverage and limits provided by any such policy.  Any 
amount payable on a covered claim under this chapter
must be reduced by the full limits of such other coverage
as set forth on the declarations page and the association 
shall receive a full credit for such limits, or, where there 
are no applicable limits, the claim must be reduced by 
the total recovery.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, no 
person may be required to exhaust all coverage and limits 
under the policy of an insolvent insurer.
(emphases added).
We find section 38-31-100(1) is unambiguous and the plain reading of section 38-
31-100(1) requires that any recovery from solvent insurers be deducted from the 
total amount of the covered claim rather than from the Association's $300,000 
statutory cap.   
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Before seeking compensation from the Association, Respondents exhausted the 
coverage available from solvent insurers, as required by section 38-31-100(1), by 
recovering $376,622 from workers' compensation benefits and the codefendants'
other insurance policies. We find the trial court properly determined section 38-
31-100(1) mandated that the $376,622 Respondents recovered from the solvent 
insurers be deducted from the $800,000 payable on the covered claim.  See § 38-
31-100(1) ("Any amount payable on a covered claim under this chapter must be 
reduced by the full limits of such other coverage, . . . or, where there are no 
applicable limits, the claim must be reduced by the total recovery."). 
We find the language "[a]ny amount payable on a covered claim under this 
chapter" in section 38-31-100(1) refers to the total amount of damages suffered 
under the covered claim.  In addition, we find the phrase "[a]ny amount payable on 
a covered claim under this chapter" is not synonymous with "the Association's 
obligation on a covered claim"—which would be either the policy limits if the 
limits were less than or equal to $300,000, or a maximum of $300,000 if the policy 
limits exceeded $300,000.  See § 38-31-60(b) (providing the Association "is 
considered the insurer to the extent of its obligation on the covered claims and, to 
this extent, has all rights, duties, and obligations of the insolvent insurer as if the 
insurer had not become insolvent"); § 38-31-60(a)(iv) (stating the Association's 
obligation to pay covered claims "includes only the amount each covered claim is 
in excess of two hundred fifty dollars and is less than three hundred thousand 
dollars"). In our view, if the legislature had intended the statutory cap to be 
reduced by the recovery, it could have drafted the statute to read "the Association's 
obligation under this chapter must be reduced by the total recovery."  However, 
instead, the legislature said that "the claim must be reduced by the total recovery." 
§ 38-31-100(1) (emphasis added).  We find our reading of section 38-31-100(1) is 
consistent with the Act's purpose of providing some protection for consumers 
whose insurers become insolvent.  See S.C. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. 
Carolinas Roofing & Sheet Metal Contractors Self-Ins. Fund, 315 S.C. 555, 557, 
446 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1994) ("[The Association's] purpose is to provide some 
protection to insureds whose insurance companies become insolvent.").   
After offsetting the $376,622 recovery against the $800,000 covered claim, the 
remaining unpaid amount on the covered claim was $423,378, which was within 
the limits of Scott's one million dollar policy with AequiCap but exceeded the 
$300,000 statutory cap on the Association's obligation to pay. Section 38-31-
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60(a)(iv) required the Association to pay $300,000 of this outstanding amount.  
Accordingly, we hold the trial court properly applied the $376,622 offset to the 
$800,000 payable on the covered claim and did not err in ordering the Association 
to pay Respondents $300,000.  
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
	
WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
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LOCKEMY, C.J.:  In this divorce action, Carolyn Taylor-Cracraft (Wife) appeals 
the family court's order, arguing (1) the family court lacked jurisdiction to
47 

  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
apportion her 2.26 acres of riverfront property (the Highway 221 Property) because 
it was nonmarital property that had not been transmuted into marital property; (2) 
the family court erred in listing the Highway 221 Property and the parties' jointly-
owned corporation, RiverWinds Landing, Inc. (the Corporation), for sale at 
$800,000; (3) the family court's 61% to 39% division of the marital estate was not 
equitable and the family court erred in "awarding" her all of the marital debt; and 
(4) the family court erred in not awarding attorney's fees to her.  We reverse and 
remand. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Wife and her husband, Gerald Cracraft (Husband), married on October 7, 2001.  
They separated on July 13, 2010.  No children were born of the marriage. 
On September 2, 2011, Wife filed for a divorce from Husband.  On April 3, 2014, 
the family court granted Wife a divorce on the ground of adultery. The family 
court identified the marital property and awarded 61% of the marital property to 
Wife and 39% to Husband. The family court determined the Highway 221 
Property Wife owned before the marriage was transmuted into marital property.  In 
finding the Highway 221 Property transmuted, the family court concluded the 
property was used in support of the marriage and "exclusively for marital purposes 
with the expectation and intent of creating a joint retirement" by using the 
Corporation to operate a marina on the property.  The family court ordered the 
Highway 221 Property and the Corporation to be listed for sale for $800,000.  Last, 
the family court ordered Husband and Wife to pay their own attorney's fees.  Wife 
appealed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Appellate courts review appeals from the family court de novo."  Buist v. Buist, 
410 S.C. 569, 574, 766 S.E.2d 381, 383 (2014).  "Thus, an appellate court may find 
facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence."  Id. 
"[H]owever, this broad scope of review does not require the Court to disregard the 
findings of the family court, which is in a superior position to make credibility 
determinations."  Crossland v. Crossland, 408 S.C. 443, 451, 759 S.E.2d 419, 423 
(2014). "The appellant retains the burden to demonstrate the error in the family 
court's findings of fact."  Buist, 410 S.C. at 574, 766 S.E.2d at 383.
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LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Transmutation of the Highway 221 Property 
Wife argues the family court lacked jurisdiction to apportion the Highway 221 
Property because it was nonmarital property that was not transmuted into marital 
property. We agree.
Section 20-3-630(A) of the South Carolina Code (2014) defines "marital property" 
as "all real and personal property which has been acquired by the parties during the 
marriage and which is owned as of the date of filing or commencement of marital 
litigation . . . regardless of how legal title is held."  However, "property acquired by 
either party before the marriage" and "any increase in value in non-marital 
property, except to the extent that the increase resulted directly or indirectly from
efforts of the other spouse during marriage" are considered nonmarital property.  § 
20-3-630(A)(2) & (5). "The [family] court does not have jurisdiction or authority 
to apportion nonmarital property."  S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(B) (2014).
Property that is nonmarital when acquired may be transmuted into marital property 
in three ways: (1) "it becomes so commingled with marital property that it is no 
longer traceable," (2) it "is titled jointly," or (3) it "is used by the parties in support 
of the marriage or in some other way that establishes the parties' intent to make it 
marital property." Wilburn v. Wilburn, 403 S.C. 372, 384, 743 S.E.2d 734, 740 
(2013). "As a general rule, transmutation is a matter of intent to be gleaned from 
the facts of each case."  Johnson v. Johnson, 296 S.C. 289, 295, 372 S.E.2d 107, 
110 (Ct. App. 1988). "The spouse claiming transmutation must produce objective 
evidence showing that, during the marriage, the parties themselves regarded the 
property as the common property of the marriage."  Id. at 295, 372 S.E.2d at 
110−11. "Such evidence may include placing the property in joint names, 
transferring the property to the other spouse as a gift, using the property 
exclusively for marital purposes, commingling the property with marital property, 
using marital funds to build equity in the property, or exchanging the property for 
marital property." Id. at 295, 372 S.E.2d at 111. "The mere use of separate 
property to support the marriage, without some additional evidence of intent to 
treat it as property of the marriage, is not sufficient to establish transmutation."  Id. 
at 296, 372 S.E.2d at 111.
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"A party claiming an equitable interest in property upon divorce bears the burden 
of proving the property is marital." Wilburn, 403 S.C. at 382, 743 S.E.2d at 740. 
"If the party presents evidence to show the property is marital, the burden shifts to 
the other spouse to present evidence to establish the property's nonmarital 
character." Id. 
In Murray v. Murray, the husband brought a home and several rental properties 
into the marriage. 312 S.C. 154, 156−57, 439 S.E.2d 312, 314 (Ct. App. 1993).  
The income from the rental properties was deposited in a joint checking account, 
and the wife made contributions of labor and time to the improvement and 
maintenance of the marital home and rental properties.  Id. at 157−58, 439 S.E.2d 
at 314−15. Nevertheless, this court held the family court could have reasonably 
found the wife failed to prove the properties were transmuted. Id. at 158, 439 
S.E.2d at 315 (finding the family court did not commit reversible error in 
determining the home and rental properties were not marital property). The 
husband's will, executed eight years into the marriage, provided that upon his death 
his real property would be liquidated—with one-third of the proceeds to go to his 
wife and the remaining two-thirds to go to his children—and that his wife could 
remain in the marital home only until the estate was settled.  Id. "This [was] 
evidence that he considered the marital residence and the rental properties, which 
were still titled in his name alone, to be his separate property after his marriage to 
[his wife]."  Id. However, "[a] spouse has an equitable interest in appreciation of 
property to which she contributed during the marriage, even if the property is 
nonmarital."  Id. at 154, 159, 439 S.E.2d at 316 (finding the family court did not 
err in awarding the wife a special equity of $13,250 in the nontransmuted marital 
home, which represented fifty percent of the appreciation in the home during the 
parties' marriage).
Wife owned the Highway 221 Property before the parties married in October 2001.
She had received the property through her divorce from her first husband in June 
2001. In 2002, Husband and Wife decided to build a marina on the Highway 221 
Property, which was titled in Wife's name only.  The parties intended to use the 
profits from the marina to supplement their retirement incomes and enter early 
retirement. The parties operated the marina through the Corporation, which they 
incorporated on June 6, 2002.
Wife leased the Highway 221 Property to the Corporation for the operation of the 
marina. Wife signed the lease agreement in her capacity as landlord, and Husband 
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signed the lease on behalf of the tenant Corporation in his capacity as vice-
president and treasurer of the Corporation. The lease agreement stated the lease 
was made between Wife and the Corporation on July 1, 2002.  The lease 
agreement provided for a three-year lease commencing on July 1, 2002, and 
expiring on June 30, 2005, and gave the Corporation an option to extend the lease 
for five additional terms of three years each.  The typed date "April 2004" on the 
notary's signature block was crossed out and replaced with the handwritten date 
"July 2002." Husband testified he remembered signing the lease agreement but did 
not recall when he signed it. Wife denied backdating the date on the notary's
signature block to read "July 2002."  The lease provided the Corporation would not
pay monthly rent; instead the Corporation would pay to have the property cleared 
and graded in the first year of the lease term and would pay the county property 
taxes in the second and third years of the lease term. The lease permitted the 
Corporation to remove its personal property and trade fixtures upon the expiration 
of the lease. However, the lease provided, "All alterations, improvements[,] and 
additions, upon completion of construction thereof, shall become part of the 
Leased Premises and the property of the Landlord without payment therefore by 
Landlord and shall be surrendered to Landlord at the end of the term."
On April 19, 2004, Wife executed a will.  In the will, Wife gave Husband a life 
estate in the Highway 221 Property and gave her two children a remainder interest 
in the property upon Husband's death.  The will stated the devises of the Highway 
221 Property were subject to the lease agreement between Wife and the 
Corporation.
Husband introduced into evidence a bill from attorney James Poag, Jr., dated April 
19, 2004, charging Wife $375 for a will, lease, and spousal election waiver. The 
family court stated the evidence produced at trial suggested the lease was executed 
in April 2004 along with Wife's will, "almost two years after the lease was 
purportedly executed in July 2002."  
Wife testified she never intended the Highway 221 Property to be marital property, 
as evidenced by the lease agreement and her will.  Wife testified that she always 
intended to leave the Highway 221 Property to her children and that Husband knew 
"from day one that he would never be a part of it; he would never have a part of 
that land unless I chose to sell it."
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In 2008, Wife decided to list the Highway 221 Property and the Corporation for 
sale in a single listing for $2.4 million. Wife explained she originally did not 
intend to sell the Highway 221 Property; however, when she and Husband became 
very tired in 2008 and her health began to fail, she decided to put the property on 
the market. Wife was unable to sell the Highway 221 Property and the 
Corporation. Wife admitted that, if someone had purchased the property, the 
proceeds of the sale would have been used to supplement her and Husband's 
retirement.
Husband testified he made the following financial contributions to the Corporation: 
(1) $52,000 from his nonmarital IRA in 2003, which was used during the first 
stage of constructing the marina; (2) $25,000 from his nonmarital IRA in 2011 to
build docks; and (3) $3,000 from his social security check to pay taxes in 2011.
There was testimony that Husband contributed time and labor at the marina by 
overseeing construction, installing riprap, mowing the grass, and operating the 
marina while Wife worked at her full-time job. 
Upon our review of the record, we find the preponderance of the evidence shows 
the Highway 221 Property was not transmuted.  The lease agreement and Wife's
will show Wife intended that the Highway 221 Property remain nonmarital after 
her marriage to Husband. Instead of investing the land directly into the 
Corporation and making the land a corporate asset, Wife chose to retain ownership 
and simply lease the land to the Corporation.  We find the lease shows Wife did 
not intend to transmute the property regardless of whether the lease was executed 
in April 2004—as the family court suspected—or on July 1, 2002, as the lease 
agreement states.
In addition, we find Wife's 2004 will shows Wife considered the Highway 221 
Property to be her separate property after her marriage to Husband.  Like the 
Murray will, Wife's will—which gave Husband a life estate in the Highway 221 
Property and gave her two children a remainder interest in the property upon 
Husband's death—directed the full disposition of the property without indicating 
Husband had any right to alter the disposition.  We also find the fact Wife executed
her will two years into the marriage—rather than in 2002 when she and Husband 
first decided to build the marina—does not render the will less indicative of her 
intent that the Highway 221 Property remain nonmarital.  In Murray, the husband 
executed his will eight years into the marriage, and this court nevertheless found 
the will was sufficient evidence to affirm the family court's determination that the 
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husband intended the marital home and rental properties to remain his separate 
property after the marriage. In addition, like the property in Murray, the Highway 
221 Property has remained titled in Wife's name alone. 
We acknowledge that Wife listing the land and the Corporation for sale in 2008 for 
a single price of $2.4 million might be some evidence that she intended to 
transmute the property.  However, we find the preponderance of the evidence 
shows Wife did not intend the Highway 221 Property to become marital property.1 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the family court's finding that the Highway 221 
Property was transmuted and remand for the family court to determine whether 
Husband has an equitable interest in the appreciation of the Highway 221 Property.  
See Murray, 312 S.C. at 154, 159, 439 S.E.2d at 316 ("A spouse has an equitable 
interest in appreciation of property to which she contributed during the marriage, 
even if the property is nonmarital."). 
1 Our appellate courts have also addressed transmutation where the parties showed 
an intention to use nonmarital property for their joint retirement.  See Pittman v. 
Pittman, 407 S.C. 141, 145−46, 151, 754 S.E.2d 501, 503−04, 506−07 (2014) 
(finding the husband's land surveying business was transmuted into marital 
property when the parties decided the wife would reduce the hours she worked as a 
nurse to work for the business full-time; the parties made all major business 
decisions jointly; the wife's personal credit was used in support of the business; 
marital funds were expended to discharge business debts; and the parties agreed to 
raise the wife's salary to increase her social security income because she was older 
than the husband—"a decision the parties made for their mutual benefit so they 
would have more money during their retirement"); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 345 S.C. 88, 
99, 545 S.E.2d 531, 537 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding acreage and a rental home the 
husband acquired from his mother were transmuted into marital property when the 
parties planned to make the home their primary residence during their retirement, 
the wife was substantially involved in the general care and maintenance of the 
property, the parties expended marital funds on improving the property, and the 
husband executed a will leaving the property to the wife).  We find this case is 
distinguishable from Pittman and Jenkins because the lease and Wife's will show 
that Wife intended the Highway 221 property to remain nonmarital even though 
she and Husband intended to use their marina business to supplement their 
retirement. 
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II. Valuation of the Corporation and the Highway 221 Property  
Wife argues the family court erred in ordering the Corporation, the Highway 221 
Property, and the improvements built on the property to be listed for sale for 
$800,000. We agree.
Among other requirements, in making an equitable distribution of marital property, 
the family court must determine the fair market value of the marital property to be 
divided between the parties.  Johnson, 296 S.C. at 293, 372 S.E.2d at 110.  "By 
statute, marital property subject to equitable distribution is presumptively valued at 
the date of the divorce filing." Moore v. Moore, 414 S.C. 490, 522, 779 S.E.2d 
533, 550 (2015) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A)). 
"When valuing business interests for the purpose of equitable distribution, the 
family court should determine the fair market value of the corporate property as an 
established and going business." Id. at 524, 779 S.E.2d at 551 (quoting Reid v. 
Reid, 280 S.C. 367, 373, 312 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Ct. App. 1984).  "This is to be 
accomplished by considering the business' net asset value, the fair market value for 
its stock, and earnings or investment value."  Id.
The family court ordered the Highway 221 Property and the Corporation to be 
listed for sale for $800,000. Because we find the Highway 221 Property was not 
transmuted, we hold the family court improperly ordered the Highway 221 
Property to be sold with the Corporation.  Therefore, we reverse as to this issue and 
remand for the family court to determine the value of the Corporation alone.
III. Equitable Distribution 
Wife argues the family court's 61% to 39% division of the marital estate was not 
equitable. Wife also argues the family court erred in "'awarding' Wife all of the 
marital debt."
In making an equitable distribution of marital property, 
the court must (1) identify the marital property, both real 
and personal, to be divided between the parties; (2) 
determine the fair market value of the property so 
identified; (3) apportion the marital estate according to 
the contributions, both direct and indirect, of each party 
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to the acquisition of the property during the marriage, 
their respective assets and incomes, and any special 
equities they may have in marital assets; and (4) provide 
for an equitable division of the marital estate, including 
the manner in which distribution is to take place. 
Johnson, 296 S.C. at 293, 372 S.E.2d at 110.  "How the individual factors are 
weighed depends on the facts of each case."  Id. at 299, 372 S.E.2d at 113.  Section 
20-3-620(B) of the South Carolina Code (2004) provides factors for the family 
court to consider in apportioning marital property and instructs the family court to 
"give weight in such proportion as it finds appropriate" to each of the factors.  One 
factor the family court considers is the nonmarital property of each spouse.  § 20-3-
620(B)(7).
As previously stated, we find the Highway 221 Property was not transmuted.  
Accordingly, we reverse as to this issue and remand for the family court to 
reapportion the marital estate, which we find does not include the nontransmuted 
Highway 221 Property. In addition, the family court should reassess the 
apportionment factors—specifically, the factor relating to the nonmarital property 
of each spouse—when it reapportions the marital property on remand. 
IV. Attorney's Fees
Wife argues "attorney's fees should be revisited" if we reverse any portion of the 
family court's final order. We agree.
"The court, from time to time after considering the financial resources and marital 
fault of both parties, may order one party to pay a reasonable amount to the other 
for attorney fees, expert fees, investigation fees, costs, and suit money incurred in 
maintaining an action for divorce from the bonds of matrimony . . . ."  S.C. Code 
Ann. § 20-3-130(H) (2014). 
In determining whether to award attorney's fees, the
family court should consider the following: (1) the party's 
ability to pay his/her own attorney's fee; (2) the 
beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties'
respective financial conditions; and (4) the effect of the 
attorney's fees on each party's standard of living. 
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Brown v. Brown, 408 S.C. 582, 587, 758 S.E.2d 922, 924 (Ct. App. 2014). 
Because we find the Highway 221 Property was not transmuted and reverse and 
remand as to the first three issues raised on appeal, we reverse and remand as to the 
attorney's fees issue as well. See Crossland v. Crossland, 397 S.C. 406, 418, 725 
S.E.2d 509, 516 (Ct. App. 2012) (reversing and remanding for the family court to 
reconsider the issue of attorney's fees when substantive results achieved by counsel 
were reversed on appeal).
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the decision of the family court is 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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GEATHERS, J.:  In this divorce action between Jimmy D. McMillan (Husband) 
and Tina G. McMillan (Wife), Husband appeals the family court's final order of 
divorce, arguing the family court erred in finding: (1) Husband's business that was
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created prior to the marriage was transmuted into marital property; (2) Husband's 
businesses that were created during the marriage were marital property; (3) 
Husband did not have a nonmarital interest in his retirement accounts; and (4) 
Wife's jewelry that was acquired during the marriage was nonmarital property.  
Husband also argues the family court erred in equitably apportioning the marital 
estate without weighing the statutory factors and sealing the record without 
consideration of the necessary factors.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and 
remand.   
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Husband and Wife married on October 4, 1996.  At the time of the final divorce 
hearing, Husband was sixty-six years old, and Wife was forty-eight years old.  The 
parties did not have any children together.  Wife left the marital residence on 
December 5, 2011.  On December 31, 2011, Wife filed a complaint against 
Husband seeking an order of separate support and maintenance and requesting 
equitable division of their marital property.  On January 23, 2013, Husband filed 
an amended answer and counterclaim seeking a divorce on the grounds of adultery.  
The family court held a hearing on November 12, 13, and 14, 2013.  The parties 
presented evidence about several businesses Husband created with his partner 
Buddy Carter. In 1977, Husband and Carter started McMillan-Carter, Inc., a 
grading company.  During the marriage, Husband and Carter formed Carmac, LLC 
in 1996 and Tractor Factor, LLC in 2001 as holding companies for McMillan-
Carter's real estate and equipment.  Husband and Carter also formed Reynolds 
Utilities, LLC in 2005; Peloton, Inc. in 2006; and Panacea Biofuels, LLC in 2008.   
Husband testified he did not intend for McMillan-Carter or any of the other 
companies to be marital property.  Wife testified they "always lived out of" the 
businesses during the marriage.  The parties also presented evidence about their 
other real and personal property, including their marital home at 171 Tucapau 
Road, Husband's retirement account, and Wife's jewelry. 
On March 5, 2014, the family court entered a final order granting the parties a 
divorce on the statutory ground of adultery.  The family court found, "Throughout 
this marriage, [Husband] built his business holdings significantly to include 
multiple businesses and business properties.  [Husband] worked on a regular and 
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daily basis to expand his businesses and the marital estate.  [Wife] worked in the 
marital businesses and cared for the home."  The family court identified four 
parcels of real estate owned by Husband's businesses; these parcels were appraised 
for a total of $1,571,000 with $580,140.17 of debt.  Additionally, the family court 
identified certain personal property owned by the businesses that had marital value, 
including Husband's fifty percent share in business vehicles valued at $26,481 and 
oil containers valued at $125,000.  The family court found, "The business 
properties listed above, both real and personal[,] are marital property and subject to 
equitable division."  The family court also found Wife's jewelry "[was a gift] and 
not subject to equitable distribution."  The family court found the total value of the 
marital estate was $1,629,468.41. It apportioned to Husband "possession and 
ownership of all of his business interests to include real and personal property 
identified at [the] trial."  After apportioning the parties' remaining real and personal 
property between Husband and Wife, it ordered Husband to pay Wife $595,263.20 
to balance the equitable division of the marital estate.  The family court further 
ordered that the record be sealed "[g]iven the vast amount of financial information 
that was introduced into evidence in this matter and the fact that much of this 
information deals with [Husband's] business partner[,] who is not a party to this 
action[,] and the fact that [Wife] is a sitting Magistrate Court Judge."   
 
On March 24, 2014, Husband filed a Rule 59, SCRCP, motion to alter or amend 
the family court's order, which the family court denied.  This appeal followed.         
 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
1. Did the family court err by finding the parties' work for Husband's companies 
constituted a basis for transmutation when they were properly compensated for 
their work? 
 
2. Did the family court err by finding McMillan-Carter was transmuted into 
marital property when the company was created prior to the marriage and no 
marital funds or efforts were used to increase equity in the company?  
 
3. Did the family court err by finding Carmac and Tractor Factor were marital 
property when the companies were acquired in exchange for nonmarital property?  
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4. Did the family court err by finding Reynolds, Panacea, and Peloton were 
marital property when the vast majority of funds contributed to the companies 
were nonmarital funds? 
 
5. Did the family court err by finding Husband did not have a nonmarital interest 
in his retirement accounts when Husband presented evidence he had funds in the 
retirement accounts prior to the marriage and no contrary evidence was presented? 
 
6. Did the family court err by finding Wife's jewelry acquired during the marriage 
was nonmarital property? 
 
7. Did the family court err by dividing the marital estate without giving weight to 
the fifteen statutory factors the court is required to consider for equitable division? 
 
8. Did the family court err by sealing the record without the consent of the parties 
and without considering the factors required by the Rule 41.1(d) of the South 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure? 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
"In appeals from the family court, this [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de 
novo." Crossland v. Crossland, 408 S.C. 443, 451, 759 S.E.2d 419, 423 (2014).  
"Thus, this [c]ourt has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its own view of 
the preponderance of the evidence; however, this broad scope of review does not 
require the [c]ourt to disregard the findings of the family court, which is in a 
superior position to make credibility determinations."  Id.   
 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
 
I. Marital Estate  
 
A. Transmutation of McMillan-Carter 
 
Husband first argues the family court erred by finding McMillan-Carter, a 
company he formed prior to the marriage, was transmuted into marital property 
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because no marital funds were used to increase equity in the company.1  Husband 
further argues he and Wife were appropriately compensated for their work in the 
company with salaries and their use of income from McMillan-Carter to support 
the marriage did not demonstrate intent to transmute the business to marital 
property. We agree. 
"A party claiming an equitable interest in property upon divorce bears the burden 
of proving the property is marital." Wilburn v. Wilburn, 403 S.C. 372, 382, 743 
S.E.2d 734, 740 (2013). "If the party presents evidence to show the property is 
marital, the burden shifts to the other spouse to present evidence to establish the 
property's nonmarital character."  Id.  "If the opposing spouse can show that the 
property was acquired before the marriage or falls within a statutory exception, this 
rebuts the prima facie case for its inclusion in the marital estate."  Pruitt v. Pruitt, 
389 S.C. 250, 261, 697 S.E.2d 702, 708 (Ct. App. 2010).   
Property acquired prior to the marriage is generally nonmarital property and not 
subject to equitable division. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A)(2) (2014).  "Even if 
property is nonmarital, it may be transmuted into marital property during the 
marriage." Pruitt, 389 S.C. at 261, 697 S.E.2d at 708.  "Transmutation occurs if
the property is utilized in support of the marriage or in such a manner as to
evidence an intent to make it marital property."  Id. "Transmutation is a matter of 
intent to be gleaned from the facts of each case." Smallwood v. Smallwood, 392 
S.C. 574, 579, 709 S.E.2d 543, 545 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Jenkins v. Jenkins, 
345 S.C. 88, 98, 545 S.E.2d 531, 537 (Ct. App. 2001)).   
"The spouse claiming transmutation must produce objective evidence showing 
that, during the marriage, the parties themselves regarded the property as the 
common property of the marriage."  Id. at 579, 709 S.E.2d at 545-46 (quoting 
Johnson v. Johnson, 296 S.C. 289, 295, 372 S.E.2d 107, 110-11 (Ct. App. 1998)).  
"Such evidence may include placing the property in joint names, transferring the 
property to the other spouse as a gift, using the property exclusively for marital 
purposes, commingling the property with marital property, using marital funds to 
1 We note the family court did not explicitly find McMillan-Carter was transmuted 
or that any of Husband's other businesses were marital property.  However, we find 
the family court treated each of the companies as marital property based on our 
review of the order.      
61 

  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
build equity in the property, or exchanging the property for marital property."  Id. 
at 579, 709 S.E.2d at 546 (quoting Johnson, 296 S.C. at 295, 372 S.E.2d at 111).  
However, "[t]he mere use of separate property to support the marriage, without 
some additional evidence of intent to treat it as property of the marriage, is not 
sufficient to establish transmutation."  Id. (quoting Johnson, 296 S.C. at 295-96, 
372 S.E.2d at 111). 
We agree with Husband that Wife failed to produce objective evidence at trial 
showing McMillan-Carter was transmuted.  See id. at 579, 709 S.E.2d at 545-46; 
id. at 579, 709 S.E.2d at 546. At trial, Wife presented some evidence of 
commingling the business with marital property because she testified she used a 
company car, phone, and gas card, and she testified they planned vacations and 
"always lived out of the company."  However, we find the preponderance of the 
evidence did not demonstrate an intent to treat McMillan-Carter as marital 
property.  See id. at 579, 709 S.E.2d at 545 ("Transmutation is a matter of intent to
be gleaned from the facts of each case.").   
Husband never placed the business in Wife's name, and Michael Meilinger—an 
expert witness qualified in business valuation—testified no marital funds were 
contributed to McMillan-Carter during the marriage.  Furthermore, although Wife 
worked for the company for a year and a half without earning a salary, she then 
performed part-time work for the company for several years and earned a $52,000 
annual salary. Wife did not make any business decisions, and Meilinger testified 
she was fairly compensated for her work, which does not support transmutation.  
Additionally, Husband was paid a regular salary by the business, which Meilinger 
testified exceeded the fair market value for his work.  See Wilburn, 403 S.C. at 
385, 743 S.E.2d at 741 ("[W]hile the use of property in support of a marriage is 
relevant to transmutation, the mere use of income from nonmarital assets does not 
transmute those assets into marital property and is not relevant to transmutation.").  
We find the lack of intent to transmute is also demonstrated by the fact that 
Husband did not own the entire company, but rather was a fifty-fifty partner with 
Carter. 
Moreover, we find the facts of this case are distinguishable from other cases in 
which our courts determined businesses were transmuted.  For example, in Pittman 
v. Pittman, the supreme court found a husband's surveying business was 
transmuted when the wife reduced the hours she worked as a nurse to work full 
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time for the business, she was paid a higher salary for her services with the 
expectation it would benefit both parties in retirement together, she was listed as 
the secretary of the business, the husband and wife made business decisions 
together, her personal credit was used in support of the business, and marital funds 
were used to discharge business debt.  407 S.C. 141, 148-52, 754 S.E.2d 501, 505-
07 (2014).  Whereas the wife in Pittman played an integral part in the business and 
helped make decisions, in the present case, Wife was not actively involved in the 
business and only drew a salary for administrative work.  Furthermore, there is no 
evidence here of marital funds being used to support the business as there was in 
Pittman. 
Similarly, we find this case is distinguishable from Edwards v. Edwards, in which 
the produce stand on the husband's inherited land was the parties' main source of 
income during the marriage, the wife worked seven days a week during the stand's 
thirty-two week selling period, the wife did not receive wages for her work for the 
produce stand, and the parties had building permits naming both of them as owners 
of the property. 384 S.C. 179, 184-85, 682 S.E.2d 37, 39-40 (Ct. App. 2009).  
Here, Husband did not recognize Wife as an owner of the company like the couple 
in Edwards did in their business. Further, whereas the wife in Edwards was 
actively involved in the produce stand but not paid, Wife here was compensated 
for her work for McMillan-Carter. 
We find this case is more analogous to Wilburn, in which our supreme court held 
the wife's contributions to the management of the husband's timber company and 
use of income from the timber company to support the marriage did not establish 
transmutation.  403 S.C. at 384-85, 743 S.E.2d at 740-41; see also Smallwood, 392 
S.C. at 580, 709 S.E.2d at 546 (finding the wife's contributions of time and labor to 
the husband's three rental properties without pay were insufficient to prove 
transmutation when there was no evidence the parties regarded the rental properties 
as common to the marriage).  Overall, although Wife testified they "lived out of the 
company," we find the preponderance of the evidence does not support an intent to 
transmute. Wife was adequately compensated for her work, Wife did not make 
business decisions, Husband drew a regular salary from the company, Husband did 
not give Wife stock or name her an owner, Husband had a business partner, and no 
marital funds were used to increase equity in the company. 
B. Tractor Factor and Carmac 
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Husband also argues the family court erred by finding Tractor Factor and 
Carmac—two businesses formed during the marriage—were marital property 
because they were acquired in exchange for nonmarital property from McMillan-
Carter. We agree.  
"Generally, property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is marital 
property unless the acquisition falls under one of several exceptions."  Jenkins, 345 
S.C. at 100, 545 S.E.2d at 537-38.  "One such exception is that property acquired 
during the marriage in exchange for nonmarital property is nonmarital."  Id. at 100, 
545 S.E.2d at 538; S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A)(3).  "The burden to show 
property is not subject to equitable distribution is upon the one claiming that 
property acquired during the marriage is not marital."  Brown v. Brown, 379 S.C. 
271, 283, 665 S.E.2d 174, 181 (Ct. App. 2008).            
We find Husband has met his burden of proving the family court erred by 
determining Tractor Factor was marital property subject to equitable distribution.  
See id.; Feldman v. Feldman, 380 S.C. 538, 542, 670 S.E.2d 669, 671 (Ct. App. 
2008) ("[O]ur broad scope of review does not relieve the appellant of the burden of 
convincing this [c]ourt that the family court committed error.").  Meilinger testified 
Tractor Factor was created with one hundred percent nonmarital funds from
McMillan-Carter, and McMillan-Carter loaned Tractor Factor money for down 
payments on equipment. Wife did not provide any testimony showing Tractor 
Factor received contributions from marital funds.  See Roe v. Roe, 311 S.C. 471, 
477, 429 S.E.2d 830, 834 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding uncontradicted testimony 
offered by one spouse is sufficient to establish property is nonmarital).  
Accordingly, we find evidence in the record shows Tractor Factor was nonmarital 
property because it was acquired in exchange for nonmarital funds from McMillan-
Carter. See § 20-3-630(A)(3) (providing property acquired during the marriage in 
exchange for nonmarital property is nonmarital).   
Similarly, we find Husband met his burden of showing Carmac was nonmarital 
property. Meilinger testified Husband and Carter formed Carmac entirely with 
funds from McMillan-Carter. Wife did not provide any testimony about marital 
funds being contributed to Carmac.  See Roe, 311 S.C. at 477, 429 S.E.2d at 834 
(finding uncontradicted testimony offered by one spouse is sufficient to establish 
property is nonmarital).  Accordingly, we find evidence in the record shows 
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Carmac was nonmarital property because it was acquired in exchange for 
nonmarital property from McMillan-Carter.  See § 20-3-630(A)(3) (providing 
property acquired during the marriage in exchange for nonmarital property is 
nonmarital).   
Even though we find Carmac is nonmarital property, real estate owned by Carmac 
could still be marital property if there was evidence marital funds were used to 
purchase the real estate.  See Pool v. Pool, 321 S.C. 84, 89, 467 S.E.2d 753, 756-57 
(Ct. App. 1996), aff'd as modified, 329 S.C. 324, 494 S.E.2d 820 (1998) (finding 
exercise equipment purchased for a nonmarital business during the marriage was 
marital property because the husband used marital funds to purchase it and did not 
establish the equipment was separate property). Carmac owned four parcels of real 
estate, which the family court identified as marital business properties.  Meilinger 
testified Carmac borrowed money in 1997 to purchase 451 Pennsylvania Avenue.  
Meilinger also testified McMillan-Carter paid the debt for real properties owned by 
Carmac.  Otherwise, the record does not contain evidence of the source of funds 
for the parcels of real estate. We find the real estate was purchased with 
nonmarital funds and, therefore, should not have been classified as marital 
property.  See § 20-3-630(A)(3); Wilburn, 403 S.C. at 386, 743 S.E.2d at 741 
("[The wife's] testimony, absent any evidence to the contrary, is sufficient to 
establish the source of the funds in these accounts."). Accordingly, we find the 
family court erred by classifying the real estate owned by Carmac as marital 
property and reverse the family court's finding.        
C. Reynolds, Peloton, and Panacea 
Husband argues the family court erred by finding his three other businesses created 
during the marriage—Reynolds, Peloton, and Panacea—were marital property.  
Husband argues the minimal percentage of marital funds contributed to these 
companies compared to the amount of nonmarital funds contributed shows a lack 
of intent to treat the businesses as marital property.  We disagree. 
We find Husband has failed to meet his burden of proving the family court erred in 
determining Reynolds, Peloton, and Panacea were marital.  See Feldman, 380 S.C. 
at 542, 670 S.E.2d at 671 ("[O]ur broad scope of review does not relieve the 
appellant of the burden of convincing this [c]ourt that the family court committed 
error."); Brown, 379 S.C. at 283, 665 S.E.2d at 181 ("The burden to show property 
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is not subject to equitable distribution is upon the one claiming that property 
acquired during the marriage is not marital.").   
Neither party disputes Husband contributed some marital funds to Reynolds, 
Peloton, and Panacea. Because the evidence in the record shows Reynolds, 
Peloton, and Panacea were each formed during the marriage using a portion of 
marital funds, we find these companies were marital, and Husband did not meet his 
burden of proving the companies were nonmarital.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-
630(A) (defining marital property generally as "all real and personal 
property . . . acquired by the parties during the marriage"); see also Pool, 321 S.C. 
at 89, 467 S.E.2d at 756-57 (finding husband used marital funds to purchase 
exercise equipment and failed to meet his burden of proving the equipment was 
nonmarital property; thus, the equipment purchased during the marriage was 
marital property ); Brown, 379 S.C. at 283, 665 S.E.2d at 181.2 
D. Retirement Account 
Husband argues the family court erred by finding he did not have a nonmarital 
interest in his retirement account because he presented evidence of a $75,000 pre-
marital interest in the account, which Wife did not dispute.  We agree. 
"[B]oth vested and nonvested retirement benefits are marital property if the 
benefits are acquired during the marriage . . . ."  Shorb v. Shorb, 372 S.C. 623, 629, 
643 S.E.2d 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2007).  However, property acquired before the 
marriage, including retirement benefits, is generally nonmarital property. Id.; S.C. 
Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A)(2). 
In Chanko v. Chanko, this court held the family court erred by finding the
husband's entire retirement account was a marital asset.  327 S.C. 636, 641-42, 490 
S.E.2d 630, 633 (Ct. App. 1997). The husband accrued retirement benefits for 
seven years before the marriage and testified the retirement fund had an 
2 Although Husband argues the infusion of marital funds did not transmute the 
companies because he did not intend to treat them as marital, we find the 
companies were marital because they were formed during the marriage using a 
percentage of marital funds.  Because the companies were marital, we need not 
reach any arguments about transmutation.   
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approximate value of $75,000 prior to the marriage.  Id.  The wife did not dispute 
the premarital value the husband assigned or present evidence that the premarital 
portion of the retirement account had been transmuted.  Id. at 642, 490 S.E.2d at 
633. This court held that even though the husband did not provide any 
documentary evidence of the premarital value, it was error to include the entire 
retirement account as marital property based on the evidence presented of 
premarital value. Id. at 641-42, 490 S.E.2d at 633.  
We find the family court erred by failing to assign nonmarital value to a portion of 
Husband's retirement account.  At trial, Husband did not testify that $75,000 of his 
retirement account accrued before the marriage.  However, in his financial 
declaration, Husband stated the nonmarital portion of his retirement account had a 
$75,000 value. Additionally, Meilinger testified Husband reported a $75,000 
nonmarital value of his retirement account.  Wife did not testify about Husband's 
retirement account or dispute the $75,000 figure.  We find this situation is 
analogous to Chanko as the financial declaration and Meilinger's testimony, which 
were undisputed by Wife, were sufficient evidence for Husband to establish a 
portion of his retirement account was nonmarital.  See Chanko, 327 S.C. at 641-42, 
490 S.E.2d at 633 (holding the family court erred in awarding the wife 50% of the 
husband's entire retirement when it was undisputed the husband worked seven 
years before the marriage and the wife did not dispute the premarital value of the 
retirement account that the husband testified to at trial); Wilburn, 403 S.C. at 386, 
743 S.E.2d at 741 ("[The wife's] testimony, absent any evidence to the contrary, is 
sufficient to establish the source of the funds in these accounts.").  Accordingly, 
because the preponderance of the evidence shows Husband's retirement account 
had a $75,000 premarital value, we find the family court erred by classifying this 
portion as marital property.  See Crossland, 408 S.C. at 451, 759 S.E.2d at 423 
("[T]his [c]ourt has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its own view of the 
preponderance of the evidence . . . .").   
E. Jewelry 
Husband argues the family court erred by finding Wife's jewelry was nonmarital 
property because interspousal gifts are marital property subject to equitable 
division. We agree. 
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"'[M]arital property' . . . means all real and personal property which has been 
acquired by the parties during the marriage . . . ."  S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A) 
(2014). "Interspousal gifts of property . . . are marital property which is subject to 
division."  Id.
We find the family court erred in classifying the jewelry as nonmarital property.  
See Crossland, 408 S.C. at 451, 759 S.E.2d at 423 ("In appeals from the family 
court, this [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo.").  At trial, Husband 
testified he bought some of Wife's jewelry and Wife bought some.  Wife testified, 
"Well, the diamond, the engagement ring, we had traded up on that, so actually, he 
only paid half of what it was worth, but I honestly don't know."  This evidence 
shows that either Wife bought the jewelry during the marriage or it was an 
interspousal gift from Husband, and we find Wife failed to meet her burden of 
proving to the family court it was nonmarital.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A); 
id.("Interspousal gifts of property . . . are marital property which is subject to 
division."); Brown, 379 S.C. at 283, 665 S.E.2d at 181 ("The burden to show 
property is not subject to equitable distribution is upon the one claiming that 
property acquired during the marriage is not marital."). Accordingly, we find the 
family court erred in not considering the value of the jewelry in the equitable 
distribution. 
F. Line of Credit 
Husband argues Wife's $47,000 line of credit on the marital home after the 
separation should have been considered nonmarital debt.  We agree.    
At trial, Wife acknowledged she took a $47,000 line of credit on the marital home 
after the separation and commencement of litigation.  She testified she "needed 
money to live on."  We find Wife failed to prove this debt incurred after the 
commencement of the litigation was subject to equitable distribution.  See Wooten 
v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 547, 615 S.E.2d 98, 105 (2005) ("When a debt is incurred 
after marital litigation begins, the burden of proving the debt is marital rests upon 
the party who makes such an assertion.").  Because Wife testified she used the 
money "to live on," we find the evidence in the record shows that the debt was not 
incurred for the joint benefit of the parties. See id. ("When a debt is incurred after 
the commencement of litigation but before the final divorce decree, the family 
court may equitably apportion it as a marital debt when it is shown the debt was 
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incurred for marital purposes, i.e., for the joint benefit of both parties during the 
marriage."); id. at 547, 615 S.E.2d at 105-06 (affirming this court's reversal of the 
family court's allocation of credit card debt incurred by the wife after the start of 
the marital litigation to the husband because the wife failed to prove it was a 
marital debt). Accordingly, we find the family court erred by not considering this 
debt as nonmarital. 
II. Equitable Division 
We recognize our reversal of the family court's designation of certain property as 
marital property and Wife's jewelry as nonmarital property impacts the equitable 
distribution award.  We specifically note that two of the factors a family court must
consider in apportioning the marital estate are the value of the marital property and 
the nonmarital property of the parties.  S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-620(B)(3), (7) 
(2014). We have found the family court erred by classifying three businesses, a 
portion of Husband's retirement account, and a line of credit as marital and by 
considering Wife's jewelry nonmarital property.  Accordingly, we remand this 
matter to allow the family court to consider the equitable apportionment anew, 
analyzing the statutory factors in light of our opinion.3 See Casey v. Casey, 293 
S.C. 503, 505, 362 S.E.2d 6, 7 (1987) ("In some instances[,] the erroneous 
designation of an asset as marital property may require remanding for 
consideration of the entire equitable distribution award and alimony."); Dickert v. 
Dickert, 387 S.C. 1, 7, 691 S.E.2d 448, 451 (2010) (remanding the issue of 
equitable distribution after reversing the family court's decision about "enterprise 
goodwill" being marital property, explaining remand "will allow the family court 
to determine if a change in the marital apportionment should be made in light of 
the goodwill valuation change"). Because we are remanding this matter to the 
family court for a new equitable apportionment, we need not address Husband's 
3 We note the family court may also consider Husband's contributions to acquiring 
the marital home in analyzing the equitable apportionment factors on remand.  See 
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-620(B)(3) (providing the family court must give weight in 
such proportion as it finds appropriate to the value of the marital property, 
including "[t]he contribution of each spouse to [its] acquisition").  
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argument that the family court erred by failing to give weight to the necessary 
statutory factors.4 
III. Sealing the Record
During oral argument, the parties consented to the unsealing of the record.  Due to 
the parties' consent and because the family court did not consider the factors set 
forth in Rule 41.1(d) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure before sealing 
the record, we reverse this issue and order the family court to unseal the record on 
remand.   
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the family court is 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
HUFF and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
4 We also need not address Husband's argument that if we find Wife's company-
owned Lexus was marital property, we should look to its fair market value instead 
of valuing it at $500 for purposes of equitable division.  Because Husband raised 
this argument for the first time during oral argument, we decline to address it.  See 
Bochette v. Bochette, 300 S.C. 109, 112, 386 S.E.2d 475, 477 (Ct. App. 1989) ("An 
appellant may not use either oral argument or the reply brief as a vehicle to argue 
issues not argued in the appellant's brief."); see also Divine v. Robbins, 385 S.C. 
23, 44 n.4, 683 S.E.2d 286, 297 n.4 (Ct. App. 2009) (declining to address an issue 
raised for the first time in a reply brief).     
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MCDONALD, J.: Appellants Ron Ork and Luke Dong appeal several circuit 
court orders, arguing the court erred in (1) issuing a temporary injunction on April 
21, 2014; (2) issuing a second temporary injunction on May 16, 2014; (3) holding 
Ork in contempt of the April 21 injunction; (4) holding Ork in contempt of the 
May 16 injunction; and (5) awarding Respondent Spartanburg Buddhist Center 
(the Center) $3,500 in attorney's fees.  We reverse. 
FACTS 
The Center is the corporate entity of a Buddhist temple located in Spartanburg.  
This case stems from a disputed election that occurred at the temple on April 20, 
2014, and its relation to the construction of a new building.  At the April 20 
election, a new president and five new board members were chosen.  Two days 
before the election, the temple's head monk, Ron Ork, withdrew $61,400 from the 
Center's bank account.1  The Center filed its initial complaint against Ork on April 
21, 2014, along with a motion for a temporary injunction.
That same day, the circuit court issued an order granting the motion for a 
temporary injunction (the first injunction), stating all officers and board members 
should remain as they were before the April 20 election, pending resolution of the 
matter. Additionally, Ork was ordered to redeposit any funds taken from the 
Center's bank account within twenty-four hours.
On April 25, Ork moved to dissolve the first injunction and the circuit court held a 
hearing. On May 2, the circuit court's clerk emailed the parties' attorneys (the May
2 email) stating the court believed the disputed funds should be placed into a new 
joint account with attorneys from each party serving as signatories. Additionally, 
the email purported to enjoin both parties from encumbering the Center's assets or 
entering into contracts on the Center's behalf without the court's permission. 
On May 16, the circuit court filed an order granting a temporary injunction (the 
second injunction), denying Ork's motion to dissolve and superseding the first 
injunction. The order required Ork to deposit the disputed funds into a new
1 We decline to discuss Luke Dong's role in the case because the circuit court did 
not hold him in contempt.   
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account for which the attorneys were the only signatories. The funds could only be 
used "to pay obligations of [the Center] on which the parties agree and for which 
the parties authorize their representative attorneys to sign." The order enjoined the 
parties from encumbering the Center's assets or entering into contracts on the 
Center's behalf without the court's permission. Finally, the order stated no bond 
was required. Ork filed a motion to reconsider, arguing the first injunction was 
issued without bond and without notice and the second injunction was issued 
without bond. However, the motion was denied. 
When the parties met on June 27 to open the new account, only $1634.70 of the 
$61,400 remained. The record reveals three checks were written to a construction 
company after the first injunction was issued.  The first check was written on April 
29 in the amount of $20,000, the second on May 5 in the amount of $16,400, and 
the third on May 9 in the amount of $32,000.  Subsequently, the circuit court 
issued an order and rule to show cause why Ork should not be held in contempt.
At the contempt hearing, Ork reasserted that the first injunction was invalid 
because it was issued without notice or bond and the second injunction was invalid 
because it, too, was issued without bond.  Additionally, Ork claimed the 
injunctions did not set forth with specificity the acts intended to be restrained.  The 
circuit court found both injunctions were valid and enforceable.    
The circuit court's resulting order held Ork in civil contempt for issuing the April 
29 check less than ten days after the first injunction.  The court also held Ork in 
contempt for issuing the May 7 and May 9 checks because the first injunction 
remained in effect on those dates.  Additionally, the court found that even if the 
first injunction had expired, Ork was still in contempt for violating the directives of 
the May 2 email and the second injunction.  The court awarded the Center $3,500 
in attorney's fees and sentenced Ork to jail for five months with the opportunity to 
purge his contempt by depositing $59,765.35 into the Center's new bank account 
within ninety days. Ork's motion to reconsider was denied.  
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Willful Contempt  
"A party who refuses to abide by an injunction entered by the court would of 
course be in contempt of court and subject to sanctions . . . ."  Grosshuesch v. 
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Cramer, 377 S.C. 12, 29–30, 659 S.E.2d 112, 121 (2008).  "On appeal, this Court 
should reverse the contempt decision only if it is without evidentiary support or the 
circuit court abused its discretion." Ex parte Cannon, 385 S.C. 643, 660, 685 
S.E.2d 814, 823 (Ct. App. 2009). 
"Contempt results from the willful disobedience of a court order and before a 
person may be held in contempt, the record must be clear and specific as to acts or 
conduct upon which the contempt is based."  Ex parte Kent, 379 S.C. 633, 637, 
666 S.E.2d 921, 923 (Ct. App. 2008).  "A willful act is an act 'done voluntarily and 
intentionally with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the 
specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done; that is to say 
with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.'"  Id. (quoting State v. 
Bevilacqua, 316 S.C. 122, 129, 447 S.E.2d 213, 217 (Ct. App. 1994)).  "Once the 
moving party has made out a prima facie case [for contempt], the burden then 
shifts to the respondent to establish his . . . defense and inability to comply with the 
order." Ex parte Cannon, 385 S.C. at 661, 685 S.E.2d at 824 (quoting Miller v. 
Miller, 375 S.C. 443, 454, 652 S.E.2d 754, 760 (Ct. App. 2007)).   
Here, the circuit court found Ork in contempt because he wrote checks removing 
funds from the Center's account after the first injunction required him to redeposit 
the disputed funds back into the Center's account.  The Center argues Ork acted 
willfully by changing the account's signatories and then spending the disputed 
funds. Conversely, Ork asserts he complied with the first injunction's lone 
command to redeposit the disputed funds back into the Center's account.  The order
itself, which the circuit court acknowledged was "in-artfully drawn," only required 
Ork to "deposit any funds withdrawn from [the Center's] bank account . . . back 
into [the Center's] bank account within twenty-four (24) hours."  The order did not 
specifically reference safeguarding the money or restrict how the money could be 
spent. Accordingly, we believe it was error for the circuit court to place Ork in 
contempt for spending money from the Center's account when the first injunction 
failed to specify such restrictions and those restrictions were only implied.2 See 
2 To the extent the Center argues an April 25 chambers conference clarified that the 
disputed funds were not to be spent by either party during the litigation, we note 
the substance of that meeting was not placed on the record.  See State v. Gaskins, 
263 S.C. 343, 346, 210 S.E.2d 590, 591 (1974) ("In this State we follow the rule 
that the acts of a court of record are known by its records alone and cannot be 
established by parol testimony.").     
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Cty. of Greenville v. Mann, 347 S.C. 427, 435, 556 S.E.2d 383, 387 (2001) ("One 
may not be convicted of contempt for violating a court order which fails to tell him 
in definite terms what he must do."); id. at 435, 556 S.E.2d at 387–88 (holding an 
appellant could not be held in contempt for failing to comply with an ambiguous 
and contradictory order); Phillips v. Phillips, 288 S.C. 185, 188, 341 S.E.2d 132, 
133 (1986) ("A court need go no further in reviewing the evidence in a contempt 
action when there is uncertainty in the commands of an order . . . .  'The language 
of the commands must be clear and certain rather than implied.'" (quoting Welchel 
v. Boyter, 260 S.C. 418, 421, 196 S.E.2d 496, 498 (1973))).      
Unlike the first injunction, the second injunction specifically provided that the 
funds could only be used to pay the Center's obligations "on which the parties 
agree and for which the parties authorize their representative attorneys to sign."  
However, the three checks Ork wrote from the Center's account were all issued 
before the second injunction was filed on May 16.  See Rule 58, SCRCP (stating a 
judgment is not effective until entered in the record).  Therefore, Ork cannot be 
held in contempt because he could not willfully violate the provisions of an order 
that did not yet exist. Additionally, during oral argument, this court asked the 
Center's counsel when Ork had actual knowledge of the second injunction, and 
counsel cited a statement in Ork's brief indicating Ork did not receive the second 
injunction until May 21. 
Finally, we believe it is clear the May 2 email did not have the effect of a filed 
order. Although the circuit court correctly noted our judiciary's increasing reliance 
on new technology, our rules concerning final orders have not changed.3 See Rule 
58, SCRCP (stating a judgment is not effective until entered in the record); Ford v. 
State Ethics Comm'n, 344 S.C. 642, 646, 545 S.E.2d 821, 823 (2001) ("The written 
order is the trial judge's final order and as such constitutes the final judgment of the 
court. The final written order contains the binding instructions which are to be 
followed by the parties."); see also Serowski v. Serowski, 381 S.C. 306, 315, 672 
3 Assuming, arguendo, that the May 2 email's instructions were mandatory, Ork 
still would not have been in contempt because he had no knowledge of the email's 
contents. Notably, Ork's counsel stated during oral argument that after he received 
the email, he only told Ork that the court ruled against them on their motion to 
dissolve. Ork's counsel insisted he told Ork to wait until they received a final order 
before they reviewed the matter further.  
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S.E.2d 589, 594 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding a court's memorandum instructing 
counsel how to prepare a proposed order was not the final written order and the 
court retained discretion to change or amend the final order). Accordingly, we 
reverse the circuit court's order holding Ork in contempt.4 
II. Deficiencies in the Injunctions 
"Temporary injunctive relief rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge and 
will not be overturned unless the order is clearly erroneous." Atwood Agency v. 
Black, 374 S.C. 68, 72, 646 S.E.2d 882, 884 (2007).
Temporary injunctions are governed by the provisions of Rule 65, SCRCP.  Rule 
65(a) provides, "No temporary injunction shall be issued without notice to the 
adverse party." Rule 65(c) states, "[N]o restraining order or temporary injunction 
shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the 
court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred 
or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or 
restrained." Rule 65(d) provides, 
Every order granting an injunction . . . shall set forth the 
reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall
describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the 
complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be 
restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the 
action . . . . 
4 We sympathize with the circuit court's efforts to preserve the status quo.
Although we believe Appellants (and their counsel) understood the court's intent 
and instructions, we recognize that "before a person may be held in contempt, the 
record must be clear and specific as to acts or conduct upon which the contempt is 
based." Kent, 379 S.C. at 637, 666 S.E.2d at 923 (finding evidence in the record 
insufficient to establish Kent knew that he willfully disobeyed a court order).
76 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
(emphasis added). Ordinarily, use of the word "shall" means an action is 
mandatory. S.C. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Dickinson, 288 S.C. 189, 
191, 341 S.E.2d 134, 135 (1986). 
We find the first injunction violated certain mandatory provisions of Rule 65.  
First, the injunction was issued without notice in violation of Rule 65(a), given that 
Ork did not accept service of the motion for injunctive relief and the resulting 
order until three days after the order was issued.  Second, the injunction failed to 
require the Center to provide security in violation of Rule 65(c).  See AJG 
Holdings, LLC v. Dunn, 382 S.C. 43, 50, 674 S.E.2d 505, 508 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(remanding a case when the circuit court failed to order a party to post a bond 
before issuing a temporary injunction); Atwood, 374 S.C. at 73, 646 S.E.2d at 884 
(stating even a "nominal security bond does not satisfy Rule 65(c) because it 
erroneously assumes the injunction is proper instead of providing an amount 
sufficient to protect appellants in the event the injunction is ultimately deemed 
improper"); 12 S.C. Jur. Equity § 19 (1992) ("Rule 65(c) . . . requires that security 
be posted before the court may issue either a restraining order or temporary 
injunction."). 
Although the first injunction was captioned "Order Granting Temporary 
Injunction," the Center argues it "operated more like a temporary restraining order 
pending an order from the [t]emporary [i]njunction hearing held April 25, 2014."  
However, even if the injunction is construed as a temporary restraining order 
(TRO), the Center was still required to give security under Rule 65(c).  
Additionally, Rule 65(b) requires that a TRO issued without notice "shall define 
the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without 
notice." Here, the first injunction stated the Center would "suffer irreparable harm 
if the injunction is not granted" but did not elaborate on the injury itself or why the 
order was granted without notice.  Accordingly, we find the circuit court erred in 
issuing the April 21 order without including necessary information, regardless of 
whether it is considered a temporary injunction or a TRO. 
Likewise, we find the circuit court erred in issuing the May 16 order without 
requiring security. The second injunction stated "no bond shall be required," and 
based on the May 2 email, it appears the court's reasoning was that no bond was 
necessary "due to the security created by the dual signatory requirement" on the 
new bank account. However, as noted earlier, our appellate courts have interpreted 
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Rule 65(c) strictly. See Atwood, 374 S.C. at 73, 646 S.E.2d at 884 (stating that 
even a nominal bond of $250 was insufficient to satisfy Rule 65(c)).  Therefore, it 
was error for the circuit court to issue the second injunction without satisfying the 
requirements of Rule 65(c). 
III. Attorney's Fees and Costs 
Given our decision to reverse the circuit court's findings on contempt, we also 
reverse the award of attorney's fees. See Eaddy v. Oliver, 345 S.C. 39, 44, 545 
S.E.2d 830, 833 (Ct. App. 2001) (reversing issue of attorney's fees when the 
appellate court reversed the lower court's finding on contempt). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we hold the circuit court abused its discretion when it held 
Ork in contempt of the April 21 and May 16 orders granting injunctive relief.  
Thus, we reverse the contempt findings as well as the award of attorney's fees.  
REVERSED. 
LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS, J., concur. 
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